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 Introduction  
With the ever-growing trove of literature on World War II it would seem that there are 
few areas left to explore. Indeed, in the military history section of any given book store in the 
United States, World War II will most likely stand out in sheer quantity of books being offered 
for sale. This is no doubt because in the United States, the Second World War still looms large in 
the national memory as a beacon of pride, and in the post-war world the United States was 
catapulted firmly into the highest strata of world powers. The United States’ rise to preeminence 
has resulted in a major focus within military history on the relationships between the Allied 
nations, predominately that of the United States and Great Britain. The depth of research that has 
been dedicated to this topic is truly extensive with numerous volumes dedicated to analyzing the 
relationship of Roosevelt and Churchill, and between various generals of both nations. It would 
appear to be a topic that simply cannot be discussed any further. But this is not the case. 
When surveying this topic, one quickly realizes that the analysis of individuals has 
revolved predominately around the highest strata of military and government officials. In fact, a 
significant amount of effort has been spent on the same individuals at either the very top of the 
command hierarchy, like Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, or 
George C. Marshall; or they focus on senior commanders of the combat arms such as George S. 
Patton Jr., Omar Bradley, Bernard Montgomery, or Harold Alexander. Naturally, the focus on 
those individuals directly involved in shaping strategy or those leading large organizations in 
combat is most attractive given the available subject material and the public interest in such 
figures. Indeed, the strategic debates at the top and the feuds among commanders are rife with 
heated arguments, controversy, and intrigue amid monumental struggles. This approach has, 
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more or less, dominated the discussion and it continues to be one of keen interest to historians.1 
Despite this heavy focus on the “higher-ups” of World War II, other more recent works have 
taken on the more difficult task of giving a voice to those in the lower rungs of leadership and 
staff work.2 Accompanying this vast array of literature on the Anglo-American relationship is 
also an equally, if not larger, quantity of traditional military history with a heavy focus on 
campaigns, operations, battles, or the units that took part in them.3 Yet, among these seemingly 
endless quantities of analyses and re-evaluations of World War II and its most prominent figures, 
it seems that very few historians have attempted to grapple with the command and staff 
organizations that made the Allied enterprise function—especially during the nascent stages of 
the Anglo-American alliance in North Africa.  
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) was the first attempt in history at fully integrating a 
command organization between two separate nations with two separate command structures. 
AFHQ was created to oversee Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of French North 
                                                 
1 This approach to analyzing the Anglo-American relationship is embodied in books such as David Irving’s The War 
Between the Generals (New York: Congdon & Lattès, 1981), volumes of biographies such as Churchill’s Generals 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) edited by John Keegan, Andrew Roberts’ Masters and Commanders: 
How Four Titans Won the War in West (New York: Harper, 2009), and Great Men in the Second World War: The 
Rise and Fall of the Big Three (London: Bloomsbury, 2017) by Paul Dukes. One also need not look very hard for 
numerous volumes focused on one individual, like Carlo D’Este’s Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 2002) or the four-volume series George C. Marshall (New York: Viking Press, 1963-1989) by 
Forrest C. Pogue. Others, like War by Land, Sea, Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command 
(2010) by David Jablonsky, examine both the individual and principles or concepts that they sought to pioneer 
during the war.  
2 Battalion Commanders at War: U.S. Tactical Leadership in the Mediterranean Theater, 1942-1943 (Lawrence, 
K.S.: University Press of Kansas, 2013), by Steven Thomas Barry takes this approach in a re-evaluation of the U.S. 
officer corps during the first years of America’s involvement in the war against Germany and Italy. James Holland, 
in Together We Stand: Turning the Tide in the West: North Africa 1942-1943 (New York: Hyperion, 2005), merges 
the accounts of both the more widely known generals and lesser known soldiers at the very bottom into the general 
narrative of Anglo-American relations. This method of meshing analyses of top and bottom also appears in 
Eisenhower’s Armies: The American-British Alliance During World War II (New York: Pegasus Books, 2015) by 
Niall Barr, although it is not the main focus and the book stretches the length of the entire war.  
3 It appears that this approach is taking a slightly new direction as can be seen in in Vincent O’Hara’s TORCH: 
North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 2015). O’Hara has picked up an 
operation in a theater of World war II that seems to be viewed as a backwater, surrounding a core focus on shipping 
and the development of amphibious warfare with aspects of traditional military history.   
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Africa and it provided the arena for General Dwight Eisenhower’s first taste of the complexities 
of command during a time of war. It also eventually oversaw the entire North African Campaign 
and the invasions of Sicily and Italy, forming an organizational foundation for the 
headquarters—the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)—that oversaw 
the invasion of France and the advance through the Low Countries and into Nazi Germany. The 
U.S. Army official history of SHAEF, The Supreme Command, states that AFHQ “provided a 
laboratory for testing principles and procedures of the command and training of U.S. and British 
staffs in combined operations.”4 Despite its importance, very little has been written specifically 
addressing the command organization and its role in the war. Indeed, some accounts of the North 
African campaign, or the Mediterranean Theater of Operations more generally do not even 
mention it. Others mention AFHQ only briefly or it only appears with a purpose of supporting 
the main narrative with little discussion of the headquarters itself. As a result, most of the senior 
officers who worked directly under Eisenhower in this command organization have hardly been 
recognized in any meaningful capacity.5 Indeed, only one historian has placed AFHQ at the 
                                                 
4 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954), 56. 
The other headquarters that contributed largely to SHAEF’s creation was Headquarters, Chief of Staff to the 
Supreme Commander (COSSAC), which was created during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 to plan the 
cross-channel invasion of France; ibid., 56-58. For AFHQ’s role and evolution from 1942-1944 see the official 
history of AFHQ parts I, II, and III. PDF files can be downloaded from the Defense Technical Information Center at 
https://publicaccess.dtic.mil/psm/api/service/search/search?q=&num=10&site=default_collection&as_epq=History+
of+Allied+Force+Headquarters&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_occt=any&btnG=Search. For hard 
copies in the U.S. see: History of Allied Force Headquarters, 1942-1945; Records of Headquarters, European 
Theater of Operations, United States Army (World War II), 1942-1947, Record Group (RG) 498, Box 4071; NARA 
2, College Park, MD. For hard copies in the U.K. see: Records of the Cabinet Office (CAB); War Cabinet Office: 
Historical Section: Archivist and Librarian Files: (AL Series) (CAB 106); Subseries: War of 1939-1945; CAB 
106/515-523, The National Archives (TNA), Kew, U.K. Parts IV and V are not published but can be found in 
AFHQ Microfilm; Reel Section: Supreme Allied Commander’s Secretariat, Historical Section; Records of Allied 
Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, RG 331; NARA 2. 
5 For example, William Breuer’s Operation Torch: The Allied Gamble to Invade North Africa (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1985) does not mention AFHQ at all nor any of the officers; neither does Orr Kelly in his book 
Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa: From Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia 
(New York: J. Wiley, 2002). Carlo D’Este mentions AFHQ only briefly in a few pages of his book World War II in 
the Mediterranean, 1942-1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1990) with no mention of any 
of the officers. The same could be said of Niall Barr’s Eisenhower’s Armies. Concerning the officers some are 
indeed discussed but hardly in the context of the inner workings of AFHQ. For example, Lieutenant General Sir 
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center of his evaluation of the Anglo-American alliance in the Mediterranean. Matthew Jones’ 
Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (1990) attempts to place AFHQ 
within a larger narrative discussing both the military and political situation that unfolded in 
North Africa. On the surface it would appear that a book that places AFHQ at its core would 
provide a more nuanced analysis of the command structure; however, it does anything but this. 
In fact, Jones’s only attempt to provide any form of a layout of the command structure is buried 
in the endnotes.6 Thus, it is with this understanding that I have attempted to examine AFHQ as a 
command organization more closely, as well as a select group of lesser known senior officers, 
and intertwine these details within the larger context of the war.  
This approach has produced a considerable challenge as AFHQ quickly ballooned into a 
monolithic command structure, numbering just over 4,000 personnel by the end of 1943, 
excluding those in the combat arms.7 As a result, I have decided to narrow my analysis to the 
senior officers who presided over the General Staff Sections. Additionally, the principles of 
“unity of command and effort” and “balanced personnel,” which Eisenhower sought to champion 
in AFHQ, are best demonstrated at this level. Through this the integrated nature of AFHQ that 
forced British and American personnel to work together can be more closely examined. Another 
factor that was necessary to take into consideration was the likelihood of finding information on 
the personnel who are the focus of this study. Even limiting my examination of Anglo-American 
                                                 
Humfrey Gale, the British officer who presided over all the administrative functions of AFHQ is mentioned 
frequently, but like AFHQ only as supporting information. The most famous officer from AFHQ, besides 
Eisenhower, is probably General Walter Bedell Smith who, like Eisenhower, Patton, and Marshall, has received 
much attention by historians.  
6 See Endnote 7 of Chapter 2 of Matthew Jones, Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 246. 
7 History of Allied Force Headquarters; Part II: December 1942 - December 1943, pg. 246; History of Allied Force 
Headquarters, 1942-1945; RG 498, Box 4071; NARA 2, College Park, MD. From here on cited as “History of 
AFHQ, Pt. #, pg. #, RG 498, NARA 2.” Parts II and III of the official history are subdivided into sections with each 
section being its own book. Citations for parts II and III will thus have the addition of the section after the part 
number. For example: “Pt. II, Sec. 2.” 
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relations to the heads of the General Staff Sections has proved quite difficult as the information 
available was variable at best. For example, it took researching the primary material created by 
AFHQ in both the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, and the British National 
Archives in Kew before I was even able to determine the exact names of certain British and 
American officers. This created another issue of a balanced narrative when discussing the 
relationships of the British and American General Staff officers. As a result, I have attempted to 
discuss their interactions in a manner that brings life to AFHQ, juxtaposing them to the 
extensively covered Anglo-American relations more generally.  
Although the main focus of my work is a deep dive into the structural set-up of AFHQ 
and the relationships of the General Staff officers, it is also necessary to place these issues in the 
broader context of the war. This led to restricting my analysis to the period of AFHQ’s birth in 
August of 1942 to the end of the North African campaign in May of 1943. This has allowed me 
to focus on the period in which AFHQ was established, its organization first tested during the 
invasion of North Africa in November of 1942; and through the subsequent push to Tunisia; 
while including the changes that occurred as a result of the Casablanca Conference in January 
1943 and the jarring defeat of U.S. forces at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. A further analysis of 
AFHQ in the latter half of 1943 would require a longer and more extensive analysis as it was 
during this time that the British headquarters in charge of the Middle East was merged with 
AFHQ.8 Additionally, the official history of AFHQ notes that the operations of 1944 and 1945 
“were designed and directed by the Headquarters organization little changed from what it had 
become in 1943.”9  
                                                 
8 See History of AFHQ, Pt. III, RG 498, NARA 2. 
9 Ibid., Pt. II, Sec. 1, pg. iv. 
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The first section of this paper deals with Anglo-American relations more broadly in the 
interwar period leading into the Arcadia Conference in December 1941, after the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor. From there the discussion transitions to a focus on the debates concerning 
Allied strategy that ensued in the subsequent months. The section ends with the decision to 
invade North Africa in July 1942, entitled Operation Torch. The second section shifts focus to 
AFHQ more specifically, discussing both the principles on which the command was founded and 
also the general layout of the headquarters, dealing primarily with General Staff Sections. The 
section opens up with a discussion of the attempt by Marshall to create a unified command in 
Southeast Asia in early 1942, and Eisenhower’s role in drafting its directives. As will be seen, 
this event was a critical development for both Eisenhower and the creation of AFHQ, which is 
subsequently examined. Indeed, the principles of “unity of command and effort” and “balanced 
personnel” can be seen as “lessons-learned” from the experiences in Southeast Asia. Their 
importance cannot be understated and as such they are examined first explicitly in their meaning, 
and then demonstrated in the rest of the section with the breakdown of the General Staff 
Sections.  
The third section brings AFHQ out of its development phase and into the execution of 
Operation Torch and the subsequent push into Tunisia. Emphasis here is less on the movements 
of personnel, combat units, etc., and more so in discussing key events that exacerbated tensions 
within the Anglo-American alliance both in a broader context and within AFHQ. After the 
invasion the dealings with the French proved to be a considerable source of tension within the 
alliance more generally but also in North Africa. The peace deal brokered with Vichy Admiral 
Francois Darlan caused a political backlash domestically that simply cannot be ignored in the 
context of AFHQ and the entire operation. Additionally, the inclusion of French forces at the 
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Tunisian front was a shaping factor in how AFHQ operated and also where the French stood as 
an Allied power within the context of the headquarters. Among these issues, internal disputes 
between British and American officers began to resurge as the reality of events on the ground 
began to strain what had been a relatively amicable and hopeful relationship. I examined these 
more closely by utilizing the limited information available in order to create a set of “case 
studies” that explore how the officers of the General Staff responded to these pressures.  
Finally, in the last section I examine the changes in AFHQ that occurred as a result of the 
Casablanca Conference of January 1943 and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s offensive that led to 
the humiliating defeat of U.S. forces Kasserine Pass in February. It begins with a brief discussion 
of the changes made in the combat commands, especially the incorporation of the British Eighth 
Army and the creation of the 18th Army Group. The main focus, however, returns to the General 
Staff sections and the creation of the North African Theater of Operations, which constituted a 
profound shift in the administrative functioning of AFHQ. While military historians have 
extensively analyzed the series of defeats in the month of February and their effects on the U.S. 
military, the effects on the General Staff of AFHQ have not. This is not to say that the dismissal 
of the chief of the intelligence section of AFHQ and the U.S. commander of II Corps have not 
been covered by historians.10 Rather, historians have assumed that after these sackings the issue 
                                                 
10 In fact, there is a common narrative that has persisted with only one challenge to it occurring in the early 1980’s 
by historian Stephen E. Ambrose and rejected by Ralph Bennett. In the sixth appendix of his book, Ultra and 
Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945, Bennett chastises the attempts of Ambrose to exonerate AFHQ’s chief of G-2, 
Mockler-Ferryman, in an article published in the Journal of Contemporary History. Relying on evidence given to 
him based off of what the official British intelligence history was going to say, Ambrose claims that Mockler-
Ferryman was relieved of command to even out (on the basis of nationality) the sacking of Fredendall. Bennett 
refutes this asserting that the official history, British Intelligence in the Second World War, fails to exonerate 
Mockler-Ferryman in any substantial way. Returning to Ambrose, he points to the fact that in his book Eisenhower, 
published three years after the article, Ambrose makes no mention of the information given to him on Mockler-
Ferryman. For Bennett’s argument see: Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945 (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1989), 376. For Ambrose’s article see: Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Intelligence 
Community in World War II,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1981): 165. For what the British 
official history does, and does not, say see: F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, British 
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was resolved. My research has led me to challenge the assumptions made in this common 
narrative that continues to hold the chief of AFHQ’s intelligence was sacked because of 
incompetence. Admittedly, this challenge has absorbed a considerable amount of the final 
section, however, the implications could potentially be considerable in how the Anglo-American 
relationship should be viewed in the aftermath of the Kasserine Pass. The closing discussion 
wraps up the section with a brief description of the final months of the North African Campaign 
and the continued expansion of AFHQ throughout 1943.  
The lack of combat narrative and battle statistics has been a deliberate undertaking 
throughout this study. However, it includes enough information to keep the core discussion 
within the larger context of the phenomenon in which AFHQ was created and functioned. 
Indeed, one cannot ignore the physical conflicts when studying a military command structure in 
a time of war by placing the subject material in a vacuum for the sake of ease and brevity. 
Ideally, such a history would weave a complex narrative capturing every aspect from multiple 
perspectives. Unfortunately, this is simply impossible and so those who seek to write a history of 
their own must strike a balance between what is necessary and what can be sacrificed for the 
greater narrative. This has been one of the greatest, and most frustrating, challenges in 
conducting this study. However, such a study into the command and control bodies during a time 
of war is critical to expanding our understanding of not just how the war was fought, and won, 
but also the vast and complex array of individual reactions and relationships in an environment 
of considerable stress. Finally, and more specifically, my study has attempted to pay more than 
                                                 
Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Operations and Strategy, Vol. IV (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 577-592, 739-746. 
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lip-service to the colossal undertaking that allows combat units to reach the front lines, and that 
sustains them once there so that they can properly perform the task at hand.  
 
Part 1 – Anglo-American Relations and Strategic Debates Prior to Operation Torch 
Anglo-American relations were less than cordial prior to World War II and in fact, 
American views on Europe as a whole were unfavorable. Tracing American disdain for 
European affairs back to the Revolutionary War, historian Mark Stoler states that “[i]f 
Americans disliked and shunned European politics and nations…they had a history of disliking 
Great Britain more than the others.”11 Naturally this attitude stemmed from the fact that the 
United States had once been colonial holdings of Great Britain, but the animosity between the 
two nations continued, culminating in the War of 1812 and even spilling into the American Civil 
War. In the subsequent decades these tensions began to abate as mutual understanding of power 
relations developed; however, they were far from being eradicated. New seeds of distrust were 
sown between the United States and Britain with the outbreak of World War I. Despite American 
entrance into the war on the side of the Entente, the United States chose to fight as an “associated 
power.” The most notable conflicts arose with the deployment of American forces in Europe and 
the outcome of the post-war peace process. When U.S. troops arrived in France, the British and 
French sought to amalgamate them into existing units along the Western Front. This proposal 
met a stiff refusal by American commander General John J. Pershing, who demanded a separate 
theater of operations drawn on national lines in order to keep American forces intact. After the 
war, the U.S. Senate stirred an already simmering pot of disdain by refusing to ratify the 
                                                 
11Mark A. Stoler, Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945 (London: Hodder Arnold, 
2005), 2.  
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Versailles Treaty, which meant that the U.S. did not join the League of Nations. As a result, the 
British deemed the U.S. as “an untrustworthy and fickle ally.”12 
 The inter-war period saw little change in the mutual perceptions between the British and 
Americans. If anything, the disputes from World War I and the fallout of the Versailles Treaty 
increased tensions between the two countries, with U.S. military planners even categorizing 
Great Britain as a potential threat.13 They viewed the wartime coalition as nothing more than a 
temporary relationship and during the 1920s even drew up war plans for a potential conflict with 
the British over commercial disputes in the Atlantic. Similarly, the British viewed Anglo-
American trade disputes, as well as the size of the American navy, as potential grounds for 
war.14 However, this outlook was not firmly held by either the U.S. Army or the U.S. Navy, with 
the latter no longer seeing Great Britain as a threat by the early 1930s. The navy switched to a 
Pacific-oriented policy, code-named War Plan Orange, and instead increased cooperation with 
the British.15  
In fact, this shift in the navy’s strategic thinking is only a small glimpse into the larger 
strategic debate that raged within the American military throughout the inter-war period. 
Initially, the army opposed the navy’s switch in stance and contended that an alliance with Great 
Britain would result in misuse of American forces. Army leaders believed the British were 
manipulative and would seek only to exploit the U.S. military to bolster their empire. These 
sentiments were indicative of the still lingering distrust of the British and would continue to 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 2-3. 
13 U.S. planners designated British forces as red in inter-war color plans. 
14 Stoler, Allies in War, 3.  
15 See Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1991). 
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resurface in the coming years.16 The British view of the United States was no better. As historian 
Matthew Jones describes it, “The British were prone to resentment at the overall American 
approach to international problems in the inter-war years, where a moralizing tone was seen to 
accompany a reluctance to undertake firm commitments.”17 This was compounded by 
Roosevelt’s shifting position on international affairs, which incidentally was an approach to 
politics in general that considerably strained his relations with his own military leaders as well.18  
 The year 1938 prompted a shift in U.S. military strategy as tensions began to mount in 
Europe. Until then U.S. military planners had only considered a war with one hostile country at a 
time, focusing almost exclusively on Japan after (most) army planners abandoned their plans for 
a war with Great Britain in 1936. With the looming prospect of hostilities erupting in Europe, 
American planners were forced to consider a multi-theater war against multiple belligerents. This 
prompted the creation of the Rainbow strategic contingency plans. However, this realization did 
not immediately translate into unfettered support for the British by the U.S. military. Although 
planners had acknowledged the possibility of a Franco-Anglo-American alliance, this possibility 
was considered in only two of the five plans that constituted the Rainbow series and neither was 
seriously considered in 1939 or 1940. In fact, the most prominent plan was one that assumed the 
United States would fight alone against the Axis powers.19  
In the wake of German victories over Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, and France, 
Roosevelt had authorized a number of initiatives by the end of 1940 to give Great Britain some 
degree of support. These included limited sales of military equipment and the trade of fifty 
                                                 
16 Mark A Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World 
War II (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of Chapel Hill Press, 2000), 8-9.   
17 Jones, Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 3-4.  
18 Ibid., 4-5. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 16.  
19 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 9, 18-21.  
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antiquated destroyers for a near-century-long lease on British military bases in the Caribbean, 
Bermuda, and Canada. Roosevelt had also authorized the deployment to England of military 
observers tasked with gauging British longevity in the war.20 The president’s decision to aid 
Great Britain drew sharp, if silent criticism from the U.S. military leadership. They viewed the 
move as frittering away valuable war material that they desperately needed for their own ill-
equipped forces on a nation they viewed as all but lost. However, given Roosevelt’s insistence to 
aid the British and the latter’s survival after the Battle of Britain, U.S. military planners were 
again forced to re-evaluate their strategic options.21  
Having won re-election in November 1940, Roosevelt was no longer shackled by 
domestic constraints and sought to expand aid to the British, which British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill had been calling for since becoming prime minister in May 1940. This aid 
materialized in the Lend-Lease Act passed in March 1941, which effectively made the United 
States a de facto ally of Great Britain.22 In the same month that Roosevelt was re-elected, Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark undertook a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. 
military strategy. He developed four options, as opposed to the five in the Rainbow Plans, 
labeled plans A-D. His preferred plan, or “Plan Dog” in military parlance, was the strategic 
positioning that Stark advocated in his memorandum to the president.23 In Plan Dog Stark had, 
for the first time, definitively laid out the connection of British survival and American security 
while simultaneously avoiding the feared pitfall of American troops being utilized for British 
imperial purposes. Stark pressed for an Atlantic-focused strategy that advocated offensive 
                                                 
20 Stoler, Allies in War, 14-16, 18-20.  
21 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 28-29. 
22 Stoler, Allies in War, 18-20. 




operations in Europe, a defensive stance in the Pacific, and the initiation of strategic talks 
between American, British, Canadian and Dutch staffs. Although the plan that Stark and Army 
Chief of Staff General George Marshall presented to Roosevelt in January of 1941 was labeled 
Plan Dog, the plan itself had undergone a revision that included army critiques of Stark’s initial 
proposals. However, the army planners saw Stark’s plan as too provocative in the Pacific; having 
not forgotten their experiences in World War I they also attacked his proposal of using British 
bases to launch attacks into Europe and bluntly stated that Anglo-American strategic talks would 
only happen if U.S. forces remained under American authority.24 
The apprehensions and animosities that had existed prior to the war continued throughout 
1941 as intense debates swirled around the Lend-Lease Act and strategy. In regard to trade the 
British balked at U.S. demands that they saw as damaging and hypocritical, in the sense that they 
viewed American outlooks on the matter as a form of economic imperialism.25 Among the 
British there was also a sense of superiority and maturity in world affairs; many Britons viewed 
the Americans as infantile militarily and politically, yet necessary for the successful prosecution 
of the war effort. The Americans on the other hand still viewed the British with much cynicism 
believing, in earnest, that they were not to be trusted. Similarly, American disdain for British 
imperialism continued. Concerning strategic co-operation, Roosevelt never explicitly approved 
Plan Dog; however, he did not reject it either, and Marshall and Stark secured his approval to 
begin staff talks with the British. Thus, Anglo-American joint-strategic planning commenced 
with the U.S. military presenting a plan that roughly correlated to British strategic interests, and 
the planners declared Germany as the top priority for future operations.  
                                                 
24 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 28-33.  
25 Stoler Allies in War, 54-56.  
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Yet despite this agreement, tensions quickly arose between the two staffs. For the 
American staff, the best course of action was an immediate buildup of forces in England to 
support a large-scale operation into Europe. The British, on the other hand, argued that such an 
operation should be taken only after other Allied operations had brought Germany to the brink of 
collapse. This, they claimed, could be accomplished through strategic bombing, blockades, small 
scale operations coupled with the cultivation of homegrown resistance, acquisition of strategic 
locations, and the defeat of Italy—the latter necessitating operations in the Mediterranean and 
North Africa. The resulting report, labeled “ABC-1,” in the end amounted to little more than a 
list of differing opinions.26 Additionally, the fact that the Mediterranean was vital for the 
maintenance of the British Empire was not lost on U.S. military planners. This notion 
underpinned their assumptions of British strategy and received fresh fuel in May, after Churchill 
openly called for the United States to formally enter the war and again advocated the British 
peripheral approach.27  
Aside from the strategic dispute with the United States, 1941 proved militarily disastrous 
for the British. Their piecemeal victories in late-1940 and early-1941 in Libya and Greece were 
voided by Axis counter offensives. The advances made by the British Middle East forces were 
checked by the deployment in February 1941 of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and two 
understrength divisions of the Afrika Corps. In April, combined Axis operations in the Balkans 
quickly overwhelmed Allied forces in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete. All the while, British 
shipping was still being ravaged by German U-Boats in the Atlantic. The German onslaught 
culminated in the invasion not of Britain, but of Russia, code-named Operation Barbarossa, in 
                                                 
26 Jones, Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War, 6-7, 10-14. 
27 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 45-47.   
15 
 
late June. For the Allies this brought a highly mistrusted partner into the mix, with both the 
British and Americans agreeing to back the “lesser of two evils.” As a result, Roosevelt 
authorized the extension of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union in November, with the hope of 
keeping the Red Army in the fight and, supposedly, U.S. forces out of it.28 Unlike Roosevelt, the 
U.S. military was not as quick to change its opinions, initially believing that the Russians would 
fall before the year’s end, only to later extend that date into 1942. However, the army eventually 
saw the entanglement of the Wehrmacht in the East as an opportunity to enact their “spring-
board” offensive into Europe, despite the fact the United States was not formally at war with 
Germany. This proposal did not sit well with Roosevelt, who denied the army’s request to focus 
military production on the expansion and re-fit of its own forces, choosing instead to increase the 
material aid to Britain and Russia.29  
This all changed with the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The 
attack officially brought the United States into the war and prompted an immediate strategic 
meeting with the British. The resulting Arcadia Conference lasted two weeks—from December 
22, 1941, to January 14, 1942—and set the precedent, for better or worse, for Allied operations 
for the remainder of the year. Understanding the impact of the Japanese attack, Churchill and his 
advisors set out to keep American crosshairs on Europe and away from a full dedication to the 
war in the Pacific.30 The talks resulted in the re-affirmation of the “Germany First” strategy, 
although as historian Mark Stoler remarks, “These plans virtually ignored the changed 
circumstances of early 1942.”31 Upon Churchill’s arrival in Washington, he immediately laid out 
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a concept of an invasion of North Africa (Gymnast) to Roosevelt, and then formally espoused it 
in a meeting with their chiefs of staff the following day. An interested Roosevelt ordered a study 
into the proposed operation. The committee’s reply on December 26 threw cold water on the it, 
citing only one viable landing point in Morocco and the roughly 1,400 miles to Tunisia that 
would prove difficult to cover if the French resisted. The resulting document, drafted by the 
newly formed Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), the bilateral body that would oversee and direct 
the prosecution of the entire Allied effort during the war, did however make a vague reference to 
gaining possession of the North African littoral. On the last day of the conference Roosevelt and 
Churchill made the decision that if the political situation remained stable and shipping was 
available, Gymnast would proceed in May.32 However, in March the CCS dropped Gymnast as a 
viable operation, citing the worsening situation of the British Eighth Army in Libya, continued 
shipping losses, and a hostile Vichy France.33  
 Concrete plans to engage U.S. forces against the Germans had also failed to materialize at 
the conference. Believing that Europe was the primary theater and that it was imperative to keep 
the Russians in the war, the chief of the U.S. Army’s Operations Division, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, and his staff drafted a comprehensive war plan and submitted it to Marshal on April 
1.34 The plan consisted of three major operations: “Bolero,” a build-up of U.S. forces in the 
United Kingdom for a cross-channel invasion of mainland Europe; “Roundup,” the cross-channel 
invasion with a Spring 1943 target date; and “Sledgehammer,” an immediate landing in Northern 
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France using mostly British forces in the event that the Russians were on the brink of collapse 
before Bolero was complete. With Roosevelt’s approval Marshall presented the plan to the 
British Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) on April 9. A few days later on April 14, Marshall 
presented it again to the British War Cabinet’s Defense Committee where, after expressing 
reservations, Churchill agreed to the U.S. plan.35  
Yet, neither the CCS’s removal of Gymnast in March nor Churchill’s grudging 
agreement to Marshall’s plan were to last for very long. In the subsequent months a series of 
debates over strategy raged between the U.S. and British military leadership, Churchill, and 
Roosevelt. Within the U.S. military divides continued to grow and shift as to which theater to 
concentrate on; coupled with a heightened suspicion of British “scheming” in their insistence on 
operations in the Mediterranean. The British military, on the other hand, were at odds with 
Marshall’s proposed plan. Although not rejecting the general premise of Bolero and Roundup, 
Sledgehammer was a major point of contention as the bulk of forces involved would be British; 
their overall opinion being that the American plan “showed no appreciation 
of…consequences.”36 The official British stance, with Churchill being the largest proponent, 
emphasized Gymnast instead. Additionally, Roosevelt wanted U.S. forces engaged against 
Germany by the end of 1942 (preferably before the mid-term elections in November). In fact, he 
had considered the possibility of an invasion of North Africa since mid-1941, a stance Churchill 
no doubt exploited in the succeeding months.  
By mid-July 1942 strategic talks had essentially ground to a halt. On July 16th Roosevelt 
instructed Marshall that if the British would not accept Sledgehammer then the only option was 
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to pursue an operation in either North Africa or the Middle East.37 Despite this instruction, 
Marshall continued to press for acceptance of the U.S. plan with a revised Sledgehammer, to no 
avail. The July 24 agreement reached by the CCS, labeled CCS 94, while not a complete U.S. 
military approval of Gymnast (renamed Operation Torch), set in motion events that would lead 
to the Allied invasion of North Africa. The following day Roosevelt cabled Marshall to 
congratulate him on the outcome of CCS 94 and set an operational date for Torch for October 30, 
just a few days before the mid-term elections in the United States. Yet, on July 30 the CCS met 
to discuss Roosevelt’s seemingly ambiguous message, not knowing that the decision on 
operations had already been made. That night Roosevelt, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces of the United States, announced that Torch was to proceed, to be planned 
for the earliest date possible, and that it had operational precedence.38  
 
 
Part 2 – The Principles and Establishment of AFHQ 
 The main principle that Eisenhower set forth to champion with AFHQ—unity of 
command—originated at the Arcadia Conference. Although the “Germany First” directive was 
re-established at the conference, it had become clear that the Allied strategic disposition in 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific needed to be re-evaluated. Interestingly, Marshall and 
Eisenhower, the latter attending the conference as the newly appointed deputy chief for the 
Pacific and the Far East in the War Plans Division, both believed in the concept of unity of 
command, even though their views on the matter may have differed. Thus, when Eisenhower 
wrote a memorandum on implementing such a concept in Southeast Asia on December 24 his 
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recommendation did not fall on deaf ears. Although he believed in unity of command, in his 
memorandum Eisenhower limited the scope of its implementation to local areas only, not the 
entire theater. It was not what Marshall had envisioned. The next day the chief of staff presented 
his concept for a unified command in Southeast Asia, advocating for a single commander who 
received orders directly from the CCS (an unprecedented unification of national commands in 
itself).39 Marshall’s insistence on a unified command structure existing in every theater, taking 
orders only from Washington, was born from his experiences in World War I, during which it 
was not until 1918 that the Entente powers created a form of unified command.40 Another 
concern was that the British command culture directed theaters of operations via committee, in 
which the senior commanders of each service within the theater operated through mutual 
coordination and under supervision of the CSC and the prime minister. No single commander 
possessed sole authority within any given theater. While this “command by committee” usually 
solved inter-service issues, as historian Davis Jablonsky points out, these benefits were “more 
than offset by the inherent problems that beset committees attempting to operate in crisis 
situations.”41  It was a worrisome aspect of British command culture for Eisenhower and 
Marshall that would resurface again in 1943. 
Marshall’s proposal was born out of the acknowledgement, by both the British and the 
Americans, that a defensive line consisting of Malaya, Sumatra, Java, and the Lesser Sunda 
Islands was necessary in order to prevent the loss of vital resources in the region and a long 
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campaign of reconquest. The British were initially reluctant to consolidate such a large area 
citing concerns of effective command and control. However, Marshall had made a crucial point 
that a change in the command structure was needed in order to best husband the sparse resources 
in the area and attempt to prevent further Japanese expansion. This was coupled with a British 
desire for a unity of purpose in the Anglo-American war effort (seeing the suggestion as a way to 
keep the United States from acting unilaterally in Southeast Asia) and Marshall’s suggestion to 
give the command to Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell, who at the time was C-in-C of British 
forces in India. The British eventually acquiesced, and on December 30 Churchill cabled Wavell 
informing him of his new command, designated the American-British-Dutch-Australian 
Command (ABDA). The name derived from the fact that the Allied force composition was built 
from these four nations, as well as New Zealand. However, the experiment in unified multi-
national command was short-lived. Rushed implementation, a convoluted command structure, 
and lack of material and manpower coupled with divided national priorities in the face of 
continued Japanese advances doomed the command. Lasting a mere forty-one days, the 
command was dissolved on February 25 following the fall of Singapore and just prior to the 
allied defeat at the Battle of the Java Sea.42  
 Despite the ultimate failure of ABDA command, Eisenhower continued to work with the 
concept through the subsequent months. In early March he prepared a study for Marshall at the 
request of Roosevelt that would effectively, if not officially, divide the world into three major 
theaters split between the British and the Americans—the United States would take 
responsibility for the Pacific, the British would control the Middle and Far East, and the Atlantic 
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would be a joint Anglo-American endeavor. The proposal was forwarded to Churchill, who 
informally agreed to it on March 18. In early May, after the heated debates concerning future 
Allied strategy, Eisenhower was tasked by Marshall to begin drafting directives for the future 
commander of the European Theater of Operations. Under direction from Marshall, Eisenhower 
was not to restrict this commander the same way he had with Wavell earlier in the year. On May 
23 Eisenhower flew to England in order to determine the state of the army headquarters 
established in London which had recently been tasked with the preparations for Bolero and 
Roundup and would naturally be a part of this new theater command. While there he met with 
the British CSC, who presented a command structure for Roundup based on the committee 
system. In return Eisenhower asserted that U.S. forces were suited to a unified command and that 
in principle the United States believed it was the only way to effectively prosecute the war. The 
following day he met privately with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field 
Marshal Alan Brooke, suggesting a slight modification to the British proposal. It consisted of a 
supreme commander who took directives from the CCS with a combined Anglo-American staff 
below him. Additionally, the supreme commander would operate through his subordinate naval, 
air and ground force commanders. Under these conditions all naval forces would fall under a 
British officer, the U.S. Army would retain control of its tactical air power but strategic air forces 
would be assigned to the air commander, and the ground forces would be split along national 
lines with the British and American commanders reporting directly to the supreme commander.43 
Little did Eisenhower know that he was creating his own command.  
 After returning to Washington Eisenhower revised the directives he had previously 
drafted. On June 8, he presented his proposed directives to Marshall who strongly hinted that 
                                                 
43 Jablonsky, War by Land, Sea, and Air, 52, 55-58. 
22 
 
Eisenhower would fill the position in question. Three days later Marshall confirmed Eisenhower 
as the commanding general of the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), with 
Eisenhower assuming full command on June 24.44 As Eisenhower began to establish his new 
command the debates over Allied strategy were continuing to rage. Prior to his return to the 
United States in late July, after having fruitlessly fought for a focus on the “Bolero-Roundup-
Sledgehammer” proposal, Marshall notified Eisenhower that he was “tentatively designated” as 
“Supreme Commander” of the newly designated Operation Torch. A few weeks later, on August 
14, Eisenhower was officially declared the “Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force” 
of the North African enterprise—the title of “Supreme Commander” having been changed to 
“Commander-in-Chief” during an August 2 meeting between Eisenhower and the CSC. The 
reasons for this decision were quite simple. The responsibilities Eisenhower had essentially 
bestowed upon himself as Commanding General (CG), ETOUSA fit perfectly with the points 
agreed upon by the CCS in late July. These stipulated that the C-in-C of Operation Torch also 
preside over the initial stages of Roundup and Sledgehammer allowing the ability to re-allocate 
resources as needed and with regards to future operations. However, and more importantly, the 
C-in-C was also to be American in order to give the illusion of an American enterprise.45  
 This illusion was an absolute necessity to prevent Torch turning into a worse-case 
scenario in which the French would put up stiff resistance to the invasion. The decision to invade 
North Africa had been made shortly after the two-year anniversary of the Franco-German 
armistice on June 18, 1940, that initiated the Nazi occupation of northern France and the 
installment of the collaborationist Vichy Regime in the south. Under the agreement the Vichy 
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government, led by the aging French hero of World War I Marshal Henri Petain, was able to 
retain control of its colonial holdings as well as its fleet, deemed to be the second largest in 
Europe at the time. Fearing that this fleet would fall into the hands of Nazi Germany, thereby 
tipping the balance of naval power against them, the British presented the French with an 
ultimatum that if the French did not comply with British desires their ships would be sunk. It was 
this last scenario that played out at the port of Mers-el-Kebir, outside of the city of Oran in 
French North Africa. French refusal to abide by British demands resulted in a one-sided naval 
engagement and the deaths of 1,297 French sailors. The event marked the harsh implosion of 
Franco-British relations and for the next two years Great Britain fought “an undeclared war 
against Vichy French forces in Dakar, Syria, Madagascar, and Tunisia.”46  
It was against this fragmented political background that the Allies planned Torch and 
created the headquarters that oversaw its execution. The animosities between the former allies 
were to be a source of considerable contention and discord in the coming months. Despite the 
necessity of making Torch appear to be an American-led enterprise, Eisenhower carried his 
devotion to unity of command and effort in forging the headquarters that would preside over it. 
His devotion to this concept was also shared by his future Chief of Staff (CoS), Brigadier 
General Walter Bedell Smith, who would remain with Eisenhower in this position for the 
remainder of the war. Indeed, Smith was a close friend to Eisenhower and it was through the 
latter’s insistence that Marshall released him from his duties as secretary to the CCS, but only 
after much procrastination.47 As a result Smith would not take his position until September 15 
(additionally serving as CoS, ETOUSA) with Major General Mark A. Clark holding the title in 
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the interim period. At AFHQ Smith had two deputies directly below him, one from each nation: 
the American officer being General Alfred W. Gruenther and the British being Brigadier J. F. M. 
Whiteley.48 
 Although Clark was initially given the title of CoS as AFHQ was being fleshed-out, his 
principle position was as Eisenhower’s Deputy C-in-C (DC-in-C). Like Smith, Clark had been 
hand-picked by Eisenhower.49 Originally the CCS had wanted a British officer to fill the billet, 
however, in a meeting on August 2 Eisenhower and the British CSC decided that the DC-in-C 
should be an American. The reasoning was that if the C-in-C were to be incapacitated, his 
successor would need to maintain the “fiction of a purely American enterprise.” Eisenhower also 
requested that Clark’s responsibilities include all planning for Torch. Both the British and 
American Chiefs of Staff agreed to Eisenhower’s requests, and on August 10 Gen. Clark was 
designated as DC-in-C, although official announcement did not come until September 15, the 
day that AFHQ was officially activated.50  
  The month of August was comprised of a flurry of events as Eisenhower, the CCS, and 
the planning staffs were formulating Operation Torch and the creation of AFHQ. Since both the 
C-in-C and his deputy were U.S. officers, it was decided that the organization and staff 
procedures of AFHQ should reflect the U.S. system.51 As such the two major tiers of the 
command organization were divided into General and Special Staff sections. The General Staff 
consisted of four sections: Personnel (G-1), Intelligence (G-2), Operations (G-3), and Supply (G-
                                                 
48 History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg. 19, RG 498, NARA 2. 
49 Clark was the Commanding General (CG) of the II (US) Corps when Eisenhower made him the DC-in-C of 
AFHQ. 
50 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 55; History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pgs. 3-4, 
8, 18, RG 498, NARA 2, quote from 3.   
51 History of AFHQ, Pt. I, pg, 14, RG 498, NARA 2. 
25 
 
4).52 The commanding officer of each section was then given the title of Assistant Chief of Staff 
(ACoS). The general function of the General Staff in general and the ACoS more specifically is 
described in a staff memorandum issued on September 7, 1942. It reads:  
The duties of the General Staff with troops shall be to render professional aid and 
assistance to the general officers about them; to act as their agents in harmonizing the 
plans duties and operations of the various organizations and services under their 
jurisdiction, preparing detailed instructions for the execution of the plans of the 
Commanding General, and in supervising the execution of such instructions. 
As agents of the Commanding General, Assistant Chiefs of Staff will take action on 
all matters referred to them by other sections of the General Staff, the Special Staff, 
or by the Chief of Staff, in accordance with law, regulations and approved policies of 
the Commanding General. They will keep the Chief of Staff posted on the activities 
of their section. When Assistants of the Chief of Staff believe necessary to announce 
a new policy, or make an exception to or modify an existing policy, they will, before 
action is taken, submit the papers with recommendations to the Chief of Staff.  
In essence, the General Staff sections constituted the main general components of the 
headquarters, while the Special Staffs constituted the more specialized sub-sections. Therefore, a 
General Staff section would be comprised of multiple Special Staff sections.53  
 It was through the General and Special staff sections that Eisenhower sought to institute a 
command based on “real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.” 
To achieve this, he decided to integrate the British and U.S. staff sections as much as possible. 
For Eisenhower this was an absolute necessity; he believed “that anything less than complete 
integration of effort would spell certain disaster.” In order to facilitate the command that 
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Eisenhower envisioned it was necessary to implement what the official history of AFHQ calls 
the “principle of balanced personnel,” or a one-to-one match of British and American personnel 
in the sections that were to be integrated.54  
Although I will present a more in-depth analysis of the General Staff sections shortly, for 
the sake of clarity it seems pertinent to provide a general overview of the “division of labor.” It 
was decided that all army, navy, and air force commanders and staff from both nations were to 
be subordinate to the C-in-C. Administration, or the General Staff sections of G-2 and G-4, and 
all air services fell under the purview of the British. This left G-1 and G-3 as well as many of the 
technical services, considered Special Staffs, under the purview of the Americans.55 This policy 
also applied to the ACoS as well, whose “opposite number” was to be from the other nationality 
and given the title “deputy ACoS” (DACoS). To keep parity between the two nations in an 
integrated headquarters the DACoS was required to be an officer of “equal or near equal rank” as 
the ACoS.56 Yet, despite this division the underlying “principle of complete integration was 
applied throughout the General Staff Sections” and “the best man was assigned to each job, 
irrespective of nationality.”57 This last point was the only exception to the principle of balanced 
personnel.  
Implementation of these principles was not without difficulties and hurdles to overcome. 
Almost as soon as planning began, issues arose with the level of authority that the C-in-C would 
possess. An August 14th directive from the CCS did not state whether or not the C-in-C would 
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possess direct authority over all naval, air, and ground forces participating in Torch. This issue 
came to a head after orders were drafted for Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, commander 
of the newly created British First Army, and future commander of the Eastern Task Force of 
Torch. The orders gave Anderson the ability to circumvent Eisenhower and go straight to the 
British War Office if he disagreed with any orders Eisenhower gave to him during the operation. 
After Eisenhower expressed his objection to this loophole in his command authority, the CSC 
drafted a revised order and sent to Eisenhower before being given to Anderson. It stated that 
British commanders could appeal to the War Office only under extreme circumstances given that 
no battlefield opportunity was squandered, nor any Allied forces put in danger. It also made clear 
that British commanders must inform the C-in-C of their intentions and reasons first. 
Eisenhower’s high degree of satisfaction with the revision prompted him to forward a copy of it 
to the U.S. War Department “‘in the hope that it will serve as a model in future cases of this 
kind.’” Although the matter was ultimately settled it took a considerable amount of time, with 
the revised order having been sent to Anderson a mere two weeks before the invasion actually 
took place. Additionally, the air forces were kept separate along national lines due to objections 
by the British and American air commanders on the grounds that the operation covered too large 
of a geographical area. As a result, the respective commanders reported directly to Eisenhower.58 
Thus, it was not until late October that Eisenhower’s authority over the combat arms involved in 
Torch was defined in explicit terms. 
 The principles on which AFHQ would operate were those that drove the Combined 
Planning Staff, the body of British and U.S. planners commissioned by the CCS after they made 
                                                 




the decision to pursue Torch. The CCS charged the planners with the operational planning of 
Torch and drafting the organizational blueprint of AFHQ. The Combined Planning Staff came 
together under the command of General Gruenther on August 4, after the British and American 
planners moved into a single location at Norfolk House in St. James Square, London.59 
Numbering only twelve men in all, the group would also eventually be incorporated into the 
operations section (G-3) of AFHQ. On August 10, Clark took control of the planning staff as part 
of his duties as DC-in-C. 60 They were not the only ones to occupy the building, however, 
sharing it with the planning staffs of ETOUSA.  
The atmosphere inside Norfolk House according to General Lucian Truscott was one of 
bewilderment and confusion. “Some of the [planners] had rooms which were reasonably well 
furnished with office equipment. But many were assigned to long, almost empty halls and empty 
rooms, through which [other planners] wandered in varying degrees of uncertainty.”61 Not 
surprisingly, the British came to the merger with much of the operational planning for Torch 
having already been completed by their Future Planning Staff between July 18-25. Despite this, 
debates arose concerning the conduct of the operation, the most prominent being over the 
locations of the landings.  
The directive passed down from the CCS stated the overall objective was the seizure of 
North Africa in its entirety, with the intention of assisting the British Eighth Army fighting in 
Egypt and Libya. On August 9 Eisenhower submitted his first operational plan proposing 
landings at Casablanca in Morocco, which was seen by the Americans as a safeguard against a 
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possible Axis attack through Spain; at the Algerian cities of Algiers and Oran; and a landing 
directly in Tunisia at Bône, the latter being necessary for securing Tunisia before the Axis could 
establish a bridgehead that could threaten the entire operation. However, a debate was ignited as 
the British rejected the Casablanca landing site as “unfeasible and irrelevant,” adding that it 
would significantly delay the invasion. For the British it was imperative to have landings in 
Tunisia. The U.S. counter-argument was that a landing at Casablanca prevented the lines of 
communication from being cut at the Straights of Gibraltar by Axis forces moving through 
Spain. The revised plan submitted on August 22 removed Casablanca, although Eisenhower 
requested additional forces to add it back on the list. The resulting feud stirred up feelings that 
the U. S. military was not dedicated to the operation, given that they were no longer willing to 
take great risks as they had been with Sledgehammer. The resulting stalemate again required the 
intervention of Churchill and Roosevelt to make the final call. The two heads of state struck a 
deal that put Casablanca back on the list and to keep Oran, at the urging of Roosevelt for reasons 
of domestic politics, and made Algiers a firm commitment, at the behest of Churchill; but there 
would be no landings in Tunisia.62 Additionally, it was not until October 8 that orders designated 
task forces for each location. The Western Task Force, commanded by Major General George S. 
Patton Jr., was comprised of all U.S. forces using U.S. ships. The Center Task Force was also 
comprised entirely of U.S. forces, but using ships from the British Royal Navy. The Eastern Task 
Force was a mix of both British and U.S. forces under the command of an American officer, 
Major General Charles W. Ryder, for the initial invasion phase in order to maintain the 
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American façade. It was only after the French capitulated that Anderson would take control of 
the British component, First Army, and push east into Tunisia.63 
As the planners worked on the operational details and the debates raged over the landing 
areas, Colonel Ben M. Sawbridge was devising the internal structure of AFHQ. The original 
organization chart completed by Sawbridge on August 26th represented, more or less, what 
Eisenhower had envisioned for the headquarters, and little changed by the time it departed for 
North Africa that November (see Appendices A and B). During this time the headquarters began 
to take shape as individuals from British and American units located in Great Britain began to fill 
the headquarters personnel roster. Due to the rushed nature of the operation, this occurred while 
the planning for both the operation and the headquarters that would prosecute it were still in 
progress.64 According to Alexander Lovelace, this frantic activity resulted in a period of 
“plunder” on behalf of AFHQ.65 While Lovelace’s assertion that the U.S. Army “robbed Peter to 
pay Paul” in order to make AFHQ function is not inherently wrong, it ignores the severe reality 
of the situation. Within roughly three months Operation Torch was not only planned and 
prepared, but the command organization that would conduct it was also created—a truly 
herculean undertaking in both regards. With the invasion of France postponed, priorities 
naturally shifted. Indeed, the commanders that saw their best officers stripped from their 
commands for what appeared to be a potentially disastrous endeavor were undoubtedly upset. As 
Lovelace points out there were indeed strong objections. Despite this, the so called “plundering” 
of other commands for the creation of AFHQ was a decision born of necessity. 
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However, personnel assignments did create some confusion. A rather important, and 
interesting, case in point is that of Colonel Everett S. Hughes. Originally Hughes was brought to 
England to serve as Chief Ordnance Officer of the Service of Supply (SOS), ETOUSA, 
commanded by Major General John C. H. Lee. Shortly thereafter, in July, he was appointed as 
Lee’s Chief of Staff. However, on August 11 Hughes was approached by General Alfred 
Gruenther, one of Eisenhower’s deputy chiefs of staff, who informed him he might be placed on 
the planning staff for Torch. Recounting the encounter Hughes wrote, “Al Gruenther says that if 
I am half as good as Ike says I am I am a superman,” alluding to Hughes’s outstanding logistical 
competency. Hughes and Eisenhower also shared a long history. The two men, and their wives, 
first met in Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1926 while Hughes was an instructor at the General Service 
School and they remained friends thereafter.66 While this paves the way for the assumption that 
favoritism was involved, the fact that Hughes remained a Colonel until late September, and a 
note discussing his lack of promotion, belies that notion. On September 2 Hughes wrote “[I] 
have decided that I’ll never be a BG [brigadier general] because of that poor report Wesson 
rendered me at the APG [Aberdeen Proving Grounds].”67 It was not until August 17 that Hughes 
was brought to AFHQ to serve as the deputy to the Chief Administrative Officer, despite having 
been told by Clark seven days prior that he was to take command of the G-1 section. Despite this 
formal change in position, Hughes still held the position of CoS of SOS, ETOUSA putting him 
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under two separate commands that were both technically under the purview of Eisenhower.68 
The air was partially, if not adequately, cleared on August 19, when the CCS relieved 
Eisenhower of his responsibilities for Roundup and Sledgehammer in order to center his 
attention on Torch. Eisenhower also shifted some of his responsibilities for ETOUSA by 
appointing Major General Russel P. Hartle as Deputy Theater Commander so that once Torch 
was underway ETOUSA would still have a commander.69 While this helped lighten the burden 
on Eisenhower, who had a very large burden to bear indeed, it did not clarify the situation much 
for Hughes.  
The situation during the preparation period of Torch and the creation of AFHQ created 
complex inroads among the other U.S. commands in the U.K. as well. There was also a degree of 
complexity bringing the British component into the fold. What was to become the staff of the 
newly created British First Army was also actively engaged in the formation of AFHQ and the 
planning of Torch. Many of these staff members were originally slated to comprise part of the 
British component of AFHQ before being shifted to First Army, and their positions would shift 
again after the invasion.70 Due to circumstances such as this, much of the British representation 
during the planning phase came from frequent meetings with the War Cabinet and other 
ministries (see Appendix C). This complicated series of personnel transfers leads to the question 
of how integrated was AFHQ actually? Indeed, the organizational charts indicate that the United 
States held a dominate position within AFHQ, with many of the senior command positions being 
held by an American officer. However, appearances do not tell the whole story. In order to truly 
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70 Ibid., 23.  
33 
 
ascertain the true integrated nature of the headquarters we must dive deeper into its structural 
make-up.  
The best place to begin is with what can be considered the “primary organization chart” 
(see Appendix B). This chart gives a basic understanding as to the core of AFHQ’s composition. 
The issue with this chart, as immensely helpful as it is, is that it is rather misleading—i.e. the 
administrative General Staff Sections (G-1 and G-4) of AFHQ are indicated as being headed by 
an American officer. In reality, all administrative staffs for both the British and Americans were 
neither integrated nor independent. Rather they operated in parallel, with their prior structures 
kept intact, and their efforts coordinated between the heads of the respective sections.71 For 
example, instead of a completely integrated supply chain, the British and Americans both 
operated according to their respective doctrines, with larger efforts being coordinated in a joint 
manner through the British and American section chiefs. The reasoning was that the 
administrative systems of the both the British and U.S. armies were so vastly different that it was 
impossible to merge them together without significantly degrading their efficiency. This 
prompted the creation of a new position that would preside over both G-1 and G-4 (see Appendix 
B), titled the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The CAO was to ensure the highest degree of 
coordination between the administrative staffs of both nationalities and “to insure the fullest use 
of common stocks.”72 In addition to this the CAO also had multiple duties concerning British 
forces only. The responsibility was given to Major General Humphrey M. Gale, who took charge 
of this billet with his arrival at Norfolk House on August 11. His title was not officially 
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designated until roughly a month later, on September 15.73 In light of this, Hughes’s move from 
potential head of G-1 to Deputy CAO can be seen as a promotion of sorts.  
With Hughes as a “deputy” to the CAO, the position of G-1 went to Colonel Sawbridge, 
the brain behind the organizational setup of AFHQ. Like Hughes, Sawbridge double-hatted as 
well, albeit for a much shorter period. Before his appointment to AFHQ he had been serving as 
Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS) of G-1, ETOUSA, and remained in this position until September 
26. The activation of G-1, AFHQ unofficially began with the arrival of Sawbridge at Norfolk 
House on August 16. His British counterpart was Brigadier Vincent J. E. Westropp, whose 
position of Deputy Adjutant General was activated a few days later, on August 19 (see Appendix 
D). The official activation of G-1 as an operating General Staff section of AFHQ was on 
September 15. As stated previously, all matters of personnel were coordinated between these two 
men, with general oversight coming from the CAO. The functions of G-1 consisted primarily of 
“planning, policy formulation, and supervision of personnel under the command of the Allied C-
in-C” and also in-theater sanitation. Although both the British and the American halves began 
operating around the same time, their full personnel complement was not the same during 1942. 
Many of the British personnel slated for G-1 were also serving as part of the administrative staff 
of the British First Army and so they would not officially be brought onto the AFHQ 
administrative staff until the following year.74  
As previously stated, G-4 (supply and evacuation) operated in parallel fashion similar to 
the G-1, with each nation operating its own supply system but larger matters being coordinated 
through the heads of the respective section (see Appendix G). G-4 began operating with the 
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appointment of Brigadier R. G. Lewis as Deputy Quartermaster General (DQMG) by the War 
Office on August 11. As DQGC, Lewis was in charge of all British supply, or “Q,” issues. The 
American side began functioning the next day on August 12 with the arrival of its ACoS, 
Colonel Archelaus L. Hamblen. The responsibilities of G-4 as a whole ranged from procurement, 
distribution, and maintenance of all supplies; procurement, construction, operation, and 
maintenance of all structures (except fortifications); all matters concerning the personnel 
involved in these tasks; and the evacuation of all supplies and personnel if the headquarters was 
forced to relocate. As with the G-1 section, during the remainder of 1942 the British side was 
rather hollow, and the remaining subordinate staffs were brought into the fold in the new year.75  
Differences in British and American General Staff sections of supply required a 
compromise that led to the creation of a new and separate section. For the U.S. Army, railways, 
roads, and waterways fell under the jurisdiction of a Special Staff Section of G-4. However, 
British doctrine recognized these matters as deserving their own general staff section, titled 
“Movements and Transportation” (see Appendix H). In order to keep things as closely integrated 
and efficient as possible, the British separation was followed and all matters concerning rails, 
roads, and waterways were placed under a separate “Movements and Transportation” General 
Staff section. Thus, AFHQ had both a G-4 and a Movements and Transportation section, each on 
an equal footing to the other as far as seniority within the hierarchy. The new section consisted of 
the U.S. Transportation Section, British “Q” Movements, and British Transportation Services. It 
began functioning, like all the other general staff sections, in the first half of August with the 
arrival of the Chief of Section, (British) Colonel A. T. de Rhe Philipe on August 10.76 The 
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section was formally activated on September 15. As previously stated, the section dealt with all 
matters concerning rails, roads, and waterways, but also included the transportation of men and 
material by air as well. The functions leading up to the invasion, however, were largely limited 
to “planning, policy formulation, allocation of facilities, and co-ordination of all executive 
action.” During this time, the control of all transportation matters rested with the movements and 
transportation sections of the three task forces. Given that the two national services had no 
choice other than to utilize the same means and modes of transportation, it was common practice 
for the British and American officers to work at adjoining desks.77 This practice included Chief 
of Section de Rhe Phillipe and the chief of the U.S. Transportation Section, Colonel Frank Ross 
(whose position was activated when Ross arrived in Algiers on November 20), working together 
in a manner like the G-1 and G-4, despite the U.S. section chief being technically subordinate.78  
G-2 (intelligence) began functioning at Norfolk House on August 11 and was officially 
activated September 15, the same day as many of the other general staff sections. Its functions 
can be summed up as control over all aspects of operational intelligence (collection, 
interpretation, dissemination, etc.) and counter-intelligence (preservation of secrecy, censorship, 
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etc.).79 G-2 was an integrated section, unlike G-1 and G-4, and so the principle of British and 
American personnel working side-by-side at every level was followed as much as possible (see 
Appendix E). Thus, the section was run by the ACoS G-2, Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman, 
and his DACoS, U.S. Colonel Theodore E. T. Haley.80 An artillery officer by trade, Mockler-
Ferryman became the chief of the intelligence section dealing with Germany in 1939 at the rank 
of colonel. In July 1940, he was reassigned to General Headquarters, Home Forces—which was 
tasked with preparing for the possibility of a German invasion of England—and promoted to 
brigadier. “I was disappointed,” he wrote after the war about these appointments. “Intelligence is 
rather a backwater and difficult to escape [from]” (although his feelings towards being in 
intelligence could have been tainted by his experience in North Africa). Instead, he had hoped to 
command an artillery brigade or regiment, a position he finally held, if only for a brief period of 
time, as commander of the Royal Artillery in Scotland from February to August 1942, stating “I 
thought I had [escaped].”81 According to Mockler-Ferryman the working relationship between 
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British and American personnel within G-2 before the invasion was bumpy and issues did arise, 
but he was surprised at “how well quickly the two nations fitted together.” For those who could 
not work with their counterparts they were “weeded out.”82  
Of all the general staff sections of AFHQ, G-3, also a fully integrated section, began 
functioning the earliest, starting on August 4, the day the Combined Planning Staff was 
assembled at Norfolk House (see Appendix F). The section’s chief, U.S. Brigadier General 
Lyman L. Lemnitzer,83 did not arrive until August 15, and even then his principle job was acting 
Deputy CoS until September 15, when Gen. Bedell Smith took over from Clark as CoS, 
AFHQ.84 An artillery officer by trade like his G-2 counter-part, Lemnitzer was a student at the 
Army War College as war began to break out in Europe, and having graduated from there he was 
pulled into the War Plans Division of the War Department’s General Staff where he was first 
acquainted with what would become Operation Torch. In 1942, and prior to his posting at 
AFHQ, he was sent to England as the commanding general of the 34th Anti-Aircraft Brigade. 
However, it was his experience and prior work in the War Plans Division that made him known 
to Eisenhower as an officer competent enough to oversee the G-3 section of AFHQ.85 This 
experience proved invaluable given the myriad of duties for which the section was responsible, 
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ranging from the organization of headquarters and field units; the planning for, and supervision 
of, all operations undertaken by all ground combat forces under AFHQ; and the training of all 
units that operated under AFHQ’s command.86 Lemnitzer’s “opposite number” was Brigadier 
Frank W. Vogel, also an artillery officer by trade, whose position was only formally announced 
on September 16.87 However, the toll of the war struck G-3 early on when Vogel was killed in a 
plane crash returning to Gibraltar from North Africa shortly after the invasion in mid-
November.88 His replacement, Brigadier C. S. Sugden, was approved by the War Office that 
month and remained as DACoS, G-3 well into 1943.89 
 
Part 3 – The Move to Africa and the “Race for Tunis” 
Given the short time-frame from planning to departure, preparations for the move of 
AFHQ began before the official activation of the headquarters was even announced. On 
September 7, roughly a week before AFHQ’s actual activation, the decision was made to 
establish a temporary command post (CP) for the invasion. The British base at Gibraltar, 
nicknamed the “Rock,” was chosen as the location for the CP in what Eisenhower called “the 
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most dismal setting we occupied during the war.”90 Codenamed Tuxford, it put the command 
element of AFHQ in a better position to coordinate the operation and maintain communication 
with the rear echelon still in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the port and airfield at Gibraltar 
were absolutely vital for the success of the landings, serving as launch points for two of the task 
forces and a significant amount of the air support for the invasion.  
However, this decision was not without immense risks. The components of AFHQ that 
occupied “the Rock” were the top echelons of AFHQ—Eisenhower and his staff, the 
commanders of the three services, their operations staffs, and those necessary for 
communications.91 This concentration of senior personnel was an immense risk given that the 
Spanish government was sympathetic to Nazi Germany. This raised the possibility that the 
Spanish could simply let the Germans move through Spain to attack the fortress. This led to 
further concerns during the debates over the landing areas that raised the prospect of having the 
line of communication to London cut off if the entire invasion force went through the Strait of 
Gibraltar.92 Although the latter concern was addressed with the inclusion of Casablanca, the 
former was unavoidable; there were no alternatives. Neither the United States nor the British 
held any other viable location between the United Kingdom and North Africa.93 The advance CP 
at Gibraltar was absolutely critical to the invasion. 
The advanced CP technically began functioning in late October, during the landing area 
debates, as various personnel began arriving at Gibraltar. The official activation date, however, 
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was not until November 5, with the arrival of Eisenhower, Clark, the commanding officers of the 
services and some of the General Staff officers.94 Of the latter only Major General Gale (CAO) 
and Colonel Sawbridge (G-1) remained in London when Rear Echelon, AFHQ was activated on 
November 2.95 Out of the six B-17 “Flying Fortresses” that carried Eisenhower and his 
entourage to Gibraltar only one did not make it on November 5. The plane carrying Generals 
Doolittle (commander of the U.S. 12th Air Force) and Lemnitzer initially had to turn back due to 
engine trouble. On its second attempt the following day the B-17 was intercepted by three 
German Ju-88 Stuka dive bombers on patrol. Fortunately, they had been nearing the limits of 
their fuel and were only able to inflict minimal damage on the B-17 but wounded the co-pilot, 
who Doolittle replaced for the remainder of the trip to Gibraltar. Despite the nature of the flight 
and its passengers, which required it to be stripped of weapons and ammunition, the Stuka attack 
did not go without response. Noticing that a .50 caliber machinegun and ammunition had been 
left in the radio compartment, Lemnitzer mounted it and began returning fire. According to his 
posthumous biography he was able to shoot down one Stuka and severely damaged another.96 
Given the limited space in the “rabbit warren of offices under the Rock,” the rest of the 
headquarters was piecemealed among the convoys slated for the operation.97 Since the initial 
convoys that headed to North Africa carried the invasion forces, limited space was available for 
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any non-combat related personnel of AFHQ. Thus, the various staff sections made bids for the 
spaces available, which then could be petitioned by the task force commanders. What portions of 
AFHQ that shipped out with the invasion forces, or that did not move to Gibraltar, trickled into 
Africa with the follow-on convoys from the United Kingdom.98  
 The only major dispute that seemed to occur in the brief period that the officers inhabited 
Gibraltar was the meeting between Eisenhower and French General Henrí Giraud. The meeting 
was part of the larger effort that had begun in October to reduce French resistance to the landings 
in North Africa, and an “earnest conviction held in both London and Washington that…Giraud 
could lead the French…into the Allied camp.”99 On November 7 Giraud was brought to 
Gibraltar to meet with Eisenhower to continue discussing these matters, which developed into a 
long and at times tense discussion about Giraud’s role in the new Allied offensive. Giraud 
apparently believed that he was to take command of all allied forces in North Africa after the 
invasion began, a suggestion rejected out of hand by the Allies. The following morning, as the 
invasion was underway, Giraud agreed to Eisenhower’s authority as C-in-C of the Allied forces, 
for which Eisenhower agreed to recognize him as C-in-C of all French forces, as well as 
governor of all French holdings, in North Africa.100 Tensions remained high nevertheless. 
Eisenhower sums up succinctly what must have been a period of immense tension and 
anxiousness in the days leading up to the invasion. He stated that “True, there was tenseness—
one could feel it in every little cave makeshifting [sic] for an office. It was natural. Within a 
matter of hours, the Allies would know the initial fate of their first combined offensive…of the 
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war.” The officers of AFHQ did not sit idly by either, with preparations and planning for the 
post-invasion period still left to do. Yet, this planning still rested on the invasion’s success, no 
doubt adding an immense sense of frustration to an already tense situation.101 Although one can 
imagine the tense feelings that must have permeated throughout Gibraltar, that no major 
argument erupted at the Rock seems to be explainable, partially at least, by the imminence of the 
invasion and the uncertainty of what lay ahead. On the one hand, any disputes that remained 
unresolved from the previous months were probably subdued in the anticipation of whether or 
not it even mattered anymore. If the invasion failed, everyone would be held accountable. 
Alternatively, the disputes that may have begun to rear their nasty heads while attempting to plan 
the post-invasion phase depended on the near-infinite number of outcomes that could follow the 
invasion. For the time being any and all disputes were put on hold until the events of November 
8, D-Day, transpired.  
The final destination of AFHQ in the move from London to North Africa was Algiers, 
codenamed Hamble, the capital city of French colonial Algeria. Preparations for the move began 
on September 28 with AFHQ Headquarters Commandant, Colonel John W. Ramsey, Jr., 
affirming that the Saint George Hotel would be a suitable location for the core of the 
headquarters. The remaining sections, however, would have to be dispersed throughout the city. 
Subsequently, General Clark notified the Eastern Task Force commander, General Anderson, 
that the hotel was needed by D-Day + 7 or sooner in order to begin setting up the 
headquarters.102 Since some components of AFHQ had been loaded onto the transports ferrying 
the three task forces from the United Kingdom, the first headquarters components of AFHQ 
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reached Algiers on November 8. They had been attached to the Eastern Task Force, commanded 
by General Ryder at the time, which had announced the city in Allied hands that night—Ryders 
command of the Task force then passed to Anderson for the advance on Tunisia. The following 
day two B-17’s transported General Clark and a small contingent of the Gibraltar CP needed to 
oversee the conduct of the push towards Tunis and to conduct “anticipated negotiations with 
French officials.”103 As with Eisenhower’s encounter with Giraud at Gibraltar, Clark’s dealings 
with the French officers in North Africa were fraught and tense. In fact, the “anticipated 
negotiations” in Algiers voided those conducted in Gibraltar as the political situation on the 
ground proved much more problematic and complex than anticipated. Giraud had lost his 
credibility among the French officers who had previously been willing to back him in his bid for 
control over French North Africa. This was partly due to the complication of Admiral Jean 
François Darlan, C-in-C of all Vichy forces, being in Algiers at the time of the invasion to visit 
his son who had been stricken with polio earlier in the year.104 On the night of November 9, 
General Alphonse Juin, commander of all French ground forces in North Africa, was able to 
persuade Giraud to abandon his aspirations of presiding over the whole of North Africa and to 
accept a purely military position. This put Giraud effectively on the sidelines as Clark arrived to 
establish a ceasefire with the French. Despite these political complications, for both the Allies 
and Vichy France, Clark and Darlan agreed to a ceasefire on the night of November 10. 
Hostilities did not officially end, however, until the following day.105  
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Over the next two months the remaining elements of AFHQ were brought to Algiers with 
the advanced CP at Gibraltar and the rear echelon in London deactivating on November 25 and 
December 25 respectively. The final component of AFHQ to reach Algiers, from the rear 
echelon, did not arrive in until January 9, 1943.106 Given the unwieldy nature of AFHQ and 
limited available shipping, the move was piecemeal and gave host to a number of issues. Despite 
a total authorized number of officers and enlisted men of 1,646, the number of personnel active 
in the headquarters at the time was a little under half that number.107 However, this discrepancy 
lies mostly in the number of British personnel, who occupied the First Army roster during this 
period (see appendix C). Additionally, the sheer distance between the United Kingdom and 
Algeria also posed serious command and control problems. In order to counteract these 
dilemmas, the Allies delegated duties within the various sections and sub-sections of the 
headquarters so that AFHQ could still function despite being scattered across the European and 
Mediterranean theaters of operations. One can see this in the decision to place contingents of the 
headquarters with the Eastern Task Force, the establishment of the advanced CP at Gibraltar, as 
well as the majority of the British contingent serving in First Army and much of the American 
G-4 section attached to the task forces. Space in Algiers was also a major factor to contend with, 
as AFHQ began to stake its claim in the city, and affected the time in which it took to set up a 
ground communications network after the invasion. The threat of enemy attack compounded the 
issues inherent in moving such quantities of men and material with limited shipping. Despite 
extensive efforts by the naval and air forces to protect the convoys from submarine and aerial 
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attacks, some losses were sustained in November and December. Two ships carrying AFHQ 
personnel were torpedoed forcing one, the HMS Strathallan, to be abandoned near Oran. 
However, despite losing some personnel, these attacks were not significant enough to cause any 
major hindrance to the overall functioning of AFHQ.108 
Even though the headquarters was just beginning to trickle into North Africa, and despite 
a formal and acknowledged armistice with the French, the operational timeline held no room for 
delay. On November 10 General Anderson pressed east with First Army in order to secure 
Bizerte and Tunis to cut off Rommel’s Panzer Armee Afrika before the Axis powers could 
establish a bridgehead in Tunisia. Indeed, Allied assumptions proved correct with Hitler 
committing to hold Tunisia, followed by an influx of available German forces, on the day 
Anderson began his advance. By early December Anderson’s mixed-bag army of U.S., British, 
and eventually French forces were stopped just outside of Tunis, prompting Eisenhower to call 
for a temporary halt to consolidate and reinforce Allied positions. The advance was to begin 
anew at the end of the month; however, it was delayed until March of the next year. The 
Germans and Italians used the pause to consolidate and reinforce as well, and the onset of the 
wet North African winter stripped from the Allies any hopes of a continued advance. The 
continuous rain had transformed logistical shortfalls into a logistical nightmare; not to mention 
reducing the availability of air support to the front line.109 
 Confounding an already tense situation was the incorporation of the French into the 
Allied camp. On November 13 the Allies decided that Giraud would take over command of all 
French forces in North Africa, with Juin remaining in his position as commander of French 
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ground forces.110 Although the question of Giraud’s role in the whole affair (which would only 
become more complicated) had been partly solved, it did not mean that the French would 
become equals to the Americans and British in AFHQ. Instead, the French would become an 
“associated power” of sorts, working in conjunction with the American commanding general 
(Eisenhower). Their entire command and administrative organization would be kept intact and 
administered only by French personnel. Although technically this meant that the Anglo-
American-French relationship was based on co-operation, under the Clark-Darlan agreement any 
French military, and all merchant vessel, movements had to be coordinated with U.S. forces. 
Thus, the United States held a considerable amount of control over French forces. In order to 
facilitate this relationship, Giraud established his headquarters in Algiers within close proximity 
to the Saint George Hotel.111  
The tensions surrounding French involvement did not abate with this arrangement, as the 
political situation of how to deal with French North Africa placed immense strain on the Anglo-
American relationship. Some in the British camp began to see Eisenhower as focusing more on 
politics than on fighting the war, viewing Bedell Smith as the true voice of authority in 
AFHQ.112 Speaking after the war, Lemnitzer commented on the situation in North Africa stating, 
“The problem was partly diplomatic, political, fiscal, economic [and not just military] …No 
matter how you slice it, we went in on a shoestring.”113 While Lemnitzer made the comment 
forty years removed, it seems that there was little appreciation of the intertwined nature of war 
and politics among some British officers. Indeed, as the combat operations at the front ground to 
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a halt, politics in Algiers raged on. The assassination of Admiral Darlan on Christmas Eve placed 
the civil authority of High Commissioner into the “inept hands of …Giraud,” whose political 
inability was accompanied by a reluctance to engage in anything outside of strictly military 
affairs. Additionally, Eisenhower came under considerable attack on the home front with 
“people…yelling for his scalp in the United States.”114  
The situation at the front was no better. At this time the Allied frontline looked generally 
as such: Anderson and First Army held the north flank; the French XIX Corps occupied the 
center under Juin; and the U.S. II Corps under Major General Lloyd Fredendall was in control of 
the southern flank. The issues came as French forces began to occupy a larger presence in 
Tunisia in late November, with Juin refusing to be subordinated to Anderson, or any British 
officer for that matter, whom Eisenhower originally intended to entrust as CG of all Allied forces 
in Tunisia. This refusal also placed more strain on the logistical system—a nightmare caused by 
a single line of supply to the front. As a temporary solution Eisenhower decided to establish a 
forward CP of AFHQ in the Algerian city of Constantine, where both First Army and XIX Corps 
headquarters were located at the time. The intent was to unify the front under a small detachment 
from AFHQ’s staff with Major General Lucian Truscott in charge of the CP when Eisenhower 
could not be present. The planning for the CP began with Truscott’s arrival in Constantine in the 
first week of January and the CP was officially operating by January 14. Since he was still 
directly in charge of combat operations, Eisenhower made frequent trips to the CP at Constantine 
until its closure on February 20.  
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The reality at the front ultimately solved the French dilemma. In order to maintain 
effective control of the battle space, Eisenhower placed all Allied forces under Anderson on 
January 27, again receiving resistance from Juin who came to terms with the agreement on 
February 3. Giraud, who was not present for the decision, endorsed it only after the fact. The 
resulting agreement effectively placed French troops under U.S. tactical command once Giraud 
and Eisenhower agreed upon strategy.115 Although this arrangement was a solution to the issue 
of command over French forces, this headquarters also appears to have been a temporary fix for 
Anglo-American disputes that arose out of combat performance in December.  
In mid-December Anderson complained to the British Chief of Imperial General Staff, 
General Sir Alan Brooke, that the US forces used to augment his push on Tunisia were green, 
stubborn when offered advice, and their tactics were deplorable. Some American officers in turn 
blamed Anderson for their failings citing his micromanagement of their deployments on the 
front. They subsequently began calling for a national sector that would allow U.S. combat forces 
to function on their own, and like the French, not be under the control of the British. There was 
also immense suspicion of Clark by the British, who saw him as actively trying to “discredit the 
British in the eyes of the French” in order to take Anderson’s command in Tunisia. According to 
historian Matthew Jones, the “frustrations” of some American officers were not just directed at 
Anderson but also at Eisenhower for his “showing at AFHQ, in particular with his deference to 
the British.”116 While this seems reasonable in the context of the intense situation in which these 
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men found themselves, Lemnitzer paints a slightly different story. He corroborates Jones’s 
assertion (to which his only supporting documents are accounts from Clark) that American 
officers were indeed concerned, consistently, over Eisenhower’s “leaning over on the British 
side.” Yet his comment is that it was a move to avoid friction and not outright deference. 
Lemnitzer also claims that “The average American officer felt that we were a little more 
backwards…that Field Marshal Alexander [future Deputy C-in-C to Eisenhower and C-in-C 
British Middle East Forces] was really on the American side. Overly leaning over in order to 
avoid offending them.” Additionally, he also stated that in his opinion the root of the issue was 
mostly due to personality clashes rather than to an unsurmountable barrier of Anglo-American 
differences.117 
There were also tensions within the British camp as well that lean somewhat towards 
Lemnitzer’s stance. On January 5 Gale, CAO of AFHQ, noted in his war diary that issues with 
the administrative staff of First Army were developing over jurisdictions of supply, which had 
been laid out four days prior. He wrote “Owing to the initial responsibility of the First Army 
[pushing immediately to Tunisia] it is very difficult to get them to realize that they dont [sic] 
control everything.” Nearly a month and a half later his frustrations with First Army persisted 
and had grown more pointed. “There is no doubt about it that they cannot work to a normal 
system… They demand control of almost everything under the mistaken impression that we are 
not supporting them to the maximum extent.” While these disputes were, in fact, “British-on-
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British,” Gale was a seemingly pragmatic man by nature and took his job seriously, despising 
any form dysfunctionality within the administrative sections of AFHQ. On February 6, in what 
could be easily misconstrued as a slight against U.S. personnel, Gale informed his (British) 
subordinate brigadiers and colonels, who were working closely with the Americans, that it was 
imperative that they assist “the U.S. staff in every way possible without appearing to do so.” Yet, 
the comment came three days after a meeting with Bedell Smith on the dysfunctional nature of 
the American G-4, which indeed was in a state of utter chaos at the time.118 After the Casablanca 
conference, which ended on January 24, Marshall traveled to Algiers to get a fist hand look at the 
problems facing Eisenhower. The American rear echelon so appalled him due to their “sorry 
state of disorganization [and] poor training” that he promptly relieved several senior officers of 
duty as a message.119 
 Undoubtedly the differences in command culture, military organization, and simple 
experience were root causes of much tension, yet it has also been shown that the individuals 
involved were just as much to blame. Indeed, some officers were relieved of duty due to their 
refusal to work with their counterparts. General Frank Ross, who worked with Brigadier Arthur 
de Rhe Phillipe in managing the General Staff section of Movements and Transportation, 
despised the British in general. The situation climaxed with Ross being relieved of command on 
January 26 and sent back to London.120 A junior officer from the staff, Lieutenant Colonel 
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Thomas Fuller, a reserve officer from Florida, replaced Ross until February 13 when Colonel 
George C. Stewart took over the staff section. Stewart seemed much more amicable in dealing 
with de Rhe Phillipe; in describing how he received his promotion, Stewart remarked that de Rhe 
Phillipe was one of the best officers the British army had. This, however, was not an indicator of 
good feelings across the board. Stewart and de Rhe Phillipe had a history that went back to just 
after the invasion, when Stewart was operations officer at the port of Oran. As Stewart recalls it 
they had a dispute over the efficiency of the port; de Rhe Phillipe apparently did not believe the 
reports on how much freight was being unloaded. Despite this background, when Stewart was 
assigned as Chief of Transportation and met with de Rhe Phillipe the incident seemed to be water 
under the bridge, yet telling of lingering tensions. When he approached de Rhe Phillipe his 
comment was “Rhe, I've been pulled up here to take over from Frank Ross. I don't know what it's 
all about and I sure don't know what I'm supposed to do,” to which de Rhe Phillipe responded 
“I'll tell you what you do. You come into my office. We'll have our desks in the same room, and 
we'll get along.” Stewart’s ability to work with, and listen to, de Rhe Philip is an indicator as to 
why he remained in the position for the rest of 1943.121 
 
Part 4 – Casablanca, the Battle of Kasserine Pass, and the Continued Growth of AFHQ 
By the end of 1942 the Allied strategic disposition was such that two of the key 
assumptions made earlier that year were now voided. The specter of Russian collapse had 
disappeared with a successful counter-offensive at Stalingrad that surrounded the German Sixth 
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Army, an event that would prove catastrophic for the Germans. However, U.S. forces were now 
concentrated in North Africa and in the Southwest Pacific, with fierce fighting still taking place 
on a mostly secure Guadalcanal. Additionally, over the course of the year it was shown, although 
not universally accepted, that production capacity of the United States was incapable of meeting 
the demands of the Victory Program as quickly as envisioned, removing the prospect of a cross-
channel invasion in 1943.122 In early November, before the landings in North Africa, the British 
Eighth Army launched their second assault at El Alamein. After initial success and then 
considerable setbacks, the offensive successfully put Rommel’s Panzer Armee Afrika in retreat 
towards Tunisia. By January 1943 the Eighth Army was approaching the Allied forces in 
Tunisia.123 Meanwhile German U-Boats continued to ravage Allied shipping and placed the 
crucial supply lines to the United Kingdom and Russia under immense pressure. Given the 
tumultuous nature of Allied strategic planning in 1942, Roosevelt and Churchill had realized the 
need for another major meeting between them and their military chiefs in order to generate a 
more concrete consensus. Thus, plans were made to gather at Casablanca in mid-January 1943 
and an invitation sent to Stalin, who declined by citing ongoing operations in Russia but 
expressed (ignoring Allied forces battling German and Italian troops in North Africa) his 
expectation for the promised second front to open that year.124  
The schisms that had plagued U.S. military leaders in 1942, and their fraught relationship 
with Roosevelt, continued to persist as the meeting approached. The navy and General Douglas 
MacArthur, commander in the Southwest Pacific, continued to press for a focus in the Pacific. 
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Meanwhile a split had developed over whether or not the new Mediterranean theater and 
continuation of Bolero (the build-up of forces in Britain) were competing or complementary 
priorities. Indeed, Roosevelt seemed to believe the former whereas Marshall believed in the 
latter.125 Churchill and his chiefs, however, went to Casablanca united under the premise that the 
Mediterranean theater should take priority. At Casablanca the terms of Anglo-American strategy 
in 1943 were largely set by the British and their Mediterranean focus, mainly because American 
industry could not fulfill the dictates of the Victory Program before spring 1944—a fact known 
to the JCS going into the conference.126 The Americans in return demanded more attention be 
dedicated to the Pacific, to which a vague agreement was made so long as operations there did 
not interfere with the reaffirmed “Germany First” stance. Additionally, the American’s were 
forced to admit the inability of a large-scale cross-channel invasion into France in 1943, a 
prospect that did not sit well with Stalin despite the Allies’ claim that a forthcoming strategic 
bombing offensive—Operation Pointblank—constituted a “second front in the air.” Although the 
outcome of the Casablanca Conference was largely due to economic realities, there were also 
those in the American camp who saw logic in the British plan. Admiral Earnest King, the Chief 
of Naval Operations, and General H. H. Arnold, head of the U.S. Army Air Corps, saw a secure 
Mediterranean as a means to protect shipping and gain key airfields.127  
As the American chiefs grudgingly acquiesced to British plans, the question emerged of 
where in the Mediterranean the next operation should take place. Underneath the solid exterior of 
the British delegation were opposing views on the matter that existed before the conference 
began. The capture of Sardinia followed by Corsica in order to seize airfields seemed to be the 
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prevailing prospect in the beginning. In fact, it was this approach that the planning staff of 
AFHQ insisted on. The alternative, an invasion of Sicily could not be mounted until August, 
leaving the Allied forces that were soon to amass in Tunisia sitting idle for an extended period of 
time. Despite the potentially long period of inactivity, the CCS ultimately decided on an invasion 
of Sicily. Admiral King even went as far as proposing a target date in July and would make the 
necessary adjustments in shipping to meet it. Thus, by the end of the conference the invasion of 
Sicily, code-named Operation Husky, was decided as the next major engagement of the Allied 
effort. Although the conference ended with a consensus strategy, the perceptions of many U.S. 
officers was that the British were taking the reins of Allied strategic planning, leaving the U.S. 
planners as spectators. This perception was compounded by the sweeping changes that occurred 
in AFHQ, specifically those dealing with the combat commands as a result of the incorporation 
of Eighth Army into the organizational structure.128 
Although the CP at Constantine had just been established a few days before the talks at 
Casablanca began, its replacement was a topic of discussion and indeed a crucial one. As 
previously covered, the CP was only designed as a temporary fix to the issues at the front. 
However, with the Eighth Army pushing Rommel into Tunisia throughout December and 
January (by January 23 the British had occupied Tripoli in Libya) the issue of command and 
control was once again brought to the forefront. With Eighth Army’s imminent entry into 
Tunisia the CCS decided that in order to best coordinate the British, French, and U.S. forces, 
they should be united into an army group—titled the 18th Army Group—and to restructure the air 
and naval commands, consolidating them into unified commands underneath Eisenhower.129 The 
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18th Army Group, in addition to taking over CP Constantine (including its office space), also 
took over numerous functions that until now were the responsibilities of AFHQ (see Appendix 
J). These included development and prosecution of tactical plans and operational directives in 
Tunisia; command of all Allied ground forces in Tunisia; and coordination with air and naval 
assets, now operating under separate commands, “through close liaison.” However, this did not 
translate into a headquarters that was “separate and distinct from AFHQ,” as Jones has called it 
(see Appendix I). Although all responsibility for the conduct of the fighting passed to the 18th 
Army Group, administrative and supply functions were still very much under the jurisdiction of 
not only AFHQ but also the higher headquarters of Eighth Army, GHQ MEF (General 
Headquarters, Middle East Forces). AFHQ still provided for First Army and XIX and II Corps, 
while GHQ MEF maintained Eighth Army in most administrative and supply details, with the 
army group responsible for coordination and control of supplies sustaining combat operations. 
Thus, the army group was clearly still a part of AFHQ, especially considering that the CG of 18th 
Army Group was the Deputy C-in-C to Eisenhower. On January 22 Eisenhower met with 
General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, who became C-in-C of British Middle East Forces on 
August 15, 1942, to discuss the details of 18th Army Group, with “provisional approval” being 
given the following day. It was decided that Alexander would become the Deputy C-in-C, AFHQ 
and take over 18th Army Group at Constantine. Arrangements for the transition began on January 
24—Clark had been transferred to take command of the Fifth Army in Morocco on January 5, 
much to the relief of the British. However, the official announcement of Alexander’s posting did 
not come until February 18, the day he left for Constantine and after numerous urgings by 
Eisenhower to take command in the preceding weeks. The 18th Army Group remained 
                                                 




operational, with Alexander commanding, until the cessation of hostilities in Tunisia on May 
15.130  
 The placement of Alexander as Deputy C-in-C was not the only command shift that 
worried U.S. officers. The restructuring of the naval and air commands also placed two more 
highly experienced British officers under Eisenhower. With Admiral Andrew Cunningham as C-
in-C of all naval forces in the western Mediterranean and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder as 
C-in-C of all air forces (including the British Middle East Air Command and RAF command at 
Malta), it appeared that U.S. authority in AFHQ was being undermined. Eisenhower himself 
feared that the principle of unity of command channeled through a single authority at the top was 
at risk and that the British would revert to the more familiar form of command by “committee.” 
He also recognized that back in the United States there was a need to keep public attention on the 
fact that the U.S. military was not being shoved to the side by the British in what was supposed 
to be a joint venture. In fact, Brooke relished in the fact that the British were able to wrest 
control of the actual fighting from underneath a commander whose lack of combat experience 
seemed a detriment.131 Indeed, it seemed that the core principle for AFHQ that Eisenhower 
established the previous year of filling the position with the most qualified person regardless of 
nationality was beginning to look like a loop hole for British dominance.  
 While the changes in the headquarters organization created new tensions, whether 
perceived or real, they were not the only changes that took place in AFHQ after the Casablanca 
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Conference. As the official history states “the year 1943 brought with it a more comprehensive 
definition of command relations and a more complete organizational and functional development 
of staff sections and other Headquarters agencies.” As the war progressed into 1944 and 1945 the 
changes made in 1943, many in the first half of the year, remained relatively unchanged. The 
lessons learned in all aspects of conducting integrated coalition warfare in the closing months of 
1942 had been hard earned. Lemnitzer summed it up succinctly, speaking about the whole North 
African Campaign, calling it “a college education in itself.” The effects of these lessons led to 
sweeping changes in the whole of the headquarters, especially in the realm of administration and 
logistics, or what was referred to as the “Communication Zone.”132  
 The changes made to the “Communication Zone” of AFHQ are simply too vast to 
describe in adequate detail here. Both the American and British systems evolved with the 
campaign, especially in regard to the British Line of Communications and its continuous 
jurisdiction disputes with First Army and cooperation with the American supply system. The 
issue of having only a single rail line to utilize also played a heavy role in these changes. Yet, out 
of these immense series of changes, one of the more significant in the “Communication Zone” 
was the creation of the North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA). The 
function of NATOUSA was the same as ETOUSA—the administration and supply of U.S. 
personnel—and interestingly had actually been foreseen as a necessity prior to the invasion. As 
covered earlier ETOUSA, based in the United Kingdom, was tied to the supply needs of Torch 
and remained so for the duration of 1942. The creation of NATOUSA removed this burden, and 
the unnecessary distance, of having to administer the U.S. supply line all the way in North 
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Africa. However, it was not until January 14 that Eisenhower announced its necessity, as AFHQ 
had been acting as an intermediary theater headquarters given that Eisenhower still retained the 
title of CG, ETOUSA.  
Although it was conceived as a necessity before Operation Torch even launched, the 
prospect of creating another U.S. theater headquarters was discussed among the JCS at 
Casablanca with the assumption, on January 14, that it would not activate until the end of the 
Tunisian Campaign. However, shortly after his arrival to the conference Marshall announced that 
he had begun preparations to split ETOUSA into two distinct theaters. On February 3, after 
Marshall returned to Washington, he cabled Eisenhower to inform him that he would no longer 
preside over ETOUSA and that he would now be in charge of the soon-to-be-established 
NATOUSA; the boundaries of which ran from the northwest of the Iberian Peninsula, along the 
Franco-Spanish border, stretching along the southeastern coast of France and tracing the northern 
border of Italy until the Austro-Yugoslavian juncture. It would also absorb all of French West 
Africa under its jurisdiction as well (see Appendix K).133 The headquarters of NATOUSA was 
established in Algiers, alongside its parent command AFHQ (see Appendix L).134 
 The creation of the new theater headquarters brought up unexpected questions as to 
Eisenhower’s authority as C-in-C of all Allied forces, a title he retained despite no longer being 
the CG ETOUSA. However, the air was cleared surrounding this issue in a series of cables from 
the War Department, in which Marshall further clarified Eisenhower’s position. As he did with 
ETOUSA, Eisenhower also designated a Deputy Theater Commander (DTC) to run the new 
theater headquarters. The issue of fleshing out the new headquarters with the proper staff 
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sections was temporarily solved by incorporating the necessary staffs of AFHQ with 
NATOUSA; in this capacity they served dual functions with both headquarters.135 The officer 
that Eisenhower designated to be his new DTC was Major General Everett Hughes, who had 
already been serving as Gale’s “deputy” despite having remained in the United Kingdom until 
February 3, the day he left for Algiers. When he departed the United Kingdom, Hughes had no 
idea as to why exactly he was being summoned to North Africa other than three days prior 
Bedell Smith had cabled him stating he had a “grand job” for Hughes. When Hughes arrived at 
Algiers later that night the only thing he received was confusion. “Bedell says that I am to be 
Deputy Theater Commander. What does that mean?” The next day Eisenhower told him the 
same thing. “Ike says I am to be Deputy Theater Commander. Still don’t know what that 
means.”136 This is no failing on Hughes’ part for not knowing what his new title entailed and 
rests in the fact that the U.S. Army simply did not have such a position in its established 
organizational doctrine.137 It was not until February 9 that Hughes received detailed instructions 
from Eisenhower pertaining to his new position, and it was not until on February 15 that his 
position would be official. In essence, Hughes was now in charge of all logistical and 
administrative functions concerning U.S. forces that had previously been administered by 
AFHQ. Additionally, he was to establish and maintain close liaison with Gale and “in most 
respects [he became] the counterpart of the British CAO.”138  
Gale confirmed this fact to his subordinates during a meeting on February 12, stating that 
“the position of Gen. Hughes on the U.S. administrative side was more or less parallel to his own 
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position on the British administrative side.” However, Gale also made it known that he would 
continue to be the person coordinating U.S. and British administrative and logistical issues for 
combat operations.139 While it appeared that Eisenhower’s principle of unity of command was 
under siege via the combat commands, Gale serves as an example of the British officers who 
committed themselves to making AFHQ function, despite the tensions. On January 5, Gale 
remarked, “Generally speaking this Headquarters is improving but is still far from the perfect 
running machine it could be. Merging the American and British Staff organization is rather like 
trying to screw a ‘metric nut’ on to a ‘Whitworth bolt’ – however we may get the threads 
sufficiently well crossed to ensure security.” This mentality of doing what is necessary to ensure 
victory is reflected in the relationship between Gale and Hughes, which appears to have been 
amicable with Gale willing to assist Hughes in setting up NATOUSA as much as possible. 
Shortly after Hughes’ arrival at Algiers he approached Gale “despondent about being able to 
produce a satisfactory system.” It seems that Gale attempted to instill some hope in Hughes by 
welcoming his arrival and telling Hughes that he personally thought there was a dire need for 
Hughes’ headquarters. He then proceeded to sketch out a potential setup for the headquarters for 
Hughes to consider. According to Gale, the thing that mattered most was that they work closely 
together on matters; from that he believed there would be few issues and a more efficient system 
would evolve.140 Their working relationship is also a product of Hughes’ view of the British. 
While in London Hughes had grown rather fond of the British. Writing home to his wife Kate, 
just a few weeks before his departure to Algiers on December 20, Hughes gave considerable 
praise to the English men and women he had the pleasure of meeting, and stated that “It would 
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be easy to become an Anglophile.”141 Yet, the reality of the situation in North Africa would 
create inevitable tensions between the CAO and the new DTC. Over the next few months 
Hughes consistently pressed Gale on matters of organizational setup and Gale became rather 
irritated with Hughes’ insistence on discussing the issue of bringing coal to North Africa.142 
In addition to the creation of NATOUSA, Gale’s own responsibilities expanded in the 
beginning of 1943 as well and would continue to do so as the Allies pushed into Italy later that 
year (see Appendix U). On January 1 he inherited the headquarters command that administered 
British Lines of Communication (supply lines) as well as the British portion of the AFHQ staff 
that had been serving with First Army since the invasion. As stated previously, despite 
NATOUSA now absorbing the U.S. administrative and supply responsibilities of AFHQ, the 
CAO was still responsible for coordinating the supplies going to the front. By May his range of 
responsibilities had grown so large that a secretariat was established in order to assist him in his 
daily activities.143 The concerns of Hughes and the sense of Gale’s expanding responsibility can 
be seen in the changes that occurred in the G-4 and G-1 sections of AFHQ, with the creation of 
NATOUSA, and the addition of the First Army staff. 
As previously discussed the American G-4 and G-1 sections were transferred to 
NATOUSA, becoming G-1 and G-4, NATOUSA, although they retained the responsibility of 
administering the U.S. forces of AFHQ. The dual nature of the U.S. General Staff sections 
(including G-2 and G-3) did not become resolved in any meaningful way until May 8, with the 
creation of NATOUSA’s own General Staff sections. From then on, the distinct U.S. General 
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Staff sections of the two headquarters coordinated efforts through liaison. The transfer of G-1 
happened relatively seamlessly, with its formal re-designation occurring on February 15. The 
organizational layout of the section surprisingly did not change during the shift, and Sawbridge, 
recently promoted to brigadier general, remained as ACoS of the section for all of 1943 (see 
Appendices O and P). The transfer of G-4, however, resulted in a rather significant change in the 
sections priorities. The creation of Headquarters NATOUSA also entailed the creation of a 
theater Service of Supply (SOS, NATOUSA) that, in fact, took over many of the responsibilities 
of the G-4. A Chiefs of Staff conference at AFHQ on January 29 issued a directive that allowed 
G-4 to delegate its duties accordingly, leaving the section free to deal with matters of major 
importance, such as liaison with the British on the needs of combat operations (see Appendices 
V and W). Hamblen, now a brigadier general, continued to serve as ACoS of G-4 until March 
20, when he was replaced by Colonel Clarence Adcock at the request of Hughes. Adcock himself 
only remained in the position until May 8.144 The shifting of U.S. General Staff sections from 
AFHQ to NATOUSA also affected G-4, Movements and Transportation, but not until much later 
in the year. The nature of the section remained relatively the same since its creation the previous 
year; however, given that it had been elevated to a General Staff section, the U.S. Transportation 
section was removed from AFHQ entirely on May 8. Despite the transfer of the entire U.S. 
component of G-4 Movements and Transportation, it remained responsible for the combined 
transportation needs of AFHQ (see Appendices X and Y). Additionally, both de Rhe Phillipe and 
Stewart remained as the heads of their respective sections.145 As the U.S. administrative and 
supply apparatus of AFHQ began to consolidate under NATOUSA, so too did the British 
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component begin to change. As previously mentioned, the British components of G-1 and G-4, 
AFHQ had been hollow and in fact were not formally activated until January 1. This seemingly 
significant change was because the respective “services” (the equivalent of the U.S. special staff 
sections) had been operating as a part of First Army. Thus, in 1943 all components of the British 
G-1 and G-4 were finally brought under the direct command of Brigadiers R. G. Lewis, who 
continued in his position of DQMG for the rest of the year, and V. J. E. Westropp, who retained 
his billet until December 12.146  
 While a majority of the major changes within AFHQ occurred in the administrative 
General Staff sections, of which a very brief overview is given above, there were also shifts in 
G-3 (operations) and G-2 (intelligence). The degree of these changes is considerably smaller 
given that these sections were truly integrated and not paralleled like G-1 and G-4. Thus, the 
functions of G-3 stayed relatively the same during 1943, with most changes occurring in the 
form of modification or elaboration of pre-existing duties. The most significant change occurred 
with the creation of G-3, NATOUSA on May 8, which subsequently took control of all U.S. 
matters of defense and training in the Communications Zone (see Appendices S and T). As with 
the U.S. G-1 and G-4, after May 8 the two respective staffs still coordinated through liaison. 
Lemnitzer, however, never presided over these changes. In fact, he had been transferred back to 
his old command, the 34th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, on December 13 and replaced by Brigadier 
General Lowell W. Rooks, who remained ACoS, G-3 for all of 1943. Although Lemnitzer no 
longer officially served in the G-3 section, he remained on temporary duty at G-3, AFHQ, in 
order to assist with the planning of Operation Husky.147  
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 The changes made to G-2 in 1943 were similar in magnitude to those made in G-3. The 
duties of the section were augmented which led to the absorption of intelligence agencies that 
were not organic to the section and other relatively minor shifts in responsibility. Additionally, 
the transfer of the U.S. contingent of G-2 to NATOUSA followed the same pattern as the other 
General Staff sections, serving a dual purpose until May 8 (see Appendices Q and R). Although 
the general changes in G-2 were seemingly minor, some key changes were implemented as a 
result of the fighting in Tunisia. On February 1 the names of the sub-sections “Combat 
Intelligence” and “Security Intelligence” were changed to “Operational Intelligence” and 
“Counter-intelligence” respectively. This change was brought about due to confusion over the 
abbreviation for Combat Intelligence, CI, which was frequently misinterpreted as “Counter-
intelligence.” One of the biggest changes to G-2 during this period was the removal of Mockler-
Ferryman from the position of ACoS G-2 on March 25. He was succeeded by Brigadier Kenneth 
W. D. Strong, who served as ACoS G-2 for the rest of 1943.148 The reason why this may be seen 
as the biggest change in G-2, despite the obvious organizational shifts, is that Mockler-
Ferryman’s removal, from not just G-2 but also AFHQ, was a direct result of events at the 
Tunisian front that transpired in the midst of AFHQ’s transformation.  
 On February 13 the bulk of Rommel’s retreating army entered Tunisia, and the following 
day he drove what remained of his forces through the Faid Pass in the Eastern Dorsal of the Atlas 
Mountains; the southern flank of the Anglo-American-French defensive line. The area was 
controlled by overstretched and unprepared units, mainly the 1st Armored Division, belonging to 
Fredendall’s II Corps. The initial success of Rommel’s advance resulted in a crushing rout of the 
U.S. 1st Armored Division, which by February 16 had been pushed back roughly 25 miles. As the 
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path directly to the AFHQ’s Lines of Communication was being slashed open in the South, 
Anderson was reluctant to commit what reserves he had managed to muster since the 
discombobulated rush into Tunisia. He feared a potentially stronger German advance by the 5th 
Panzer Army under General Hans Jürgen von Arnim in the north against First Army. The 
piecemealed reinforcements Anderson did dispatch were sent to shore up the defenses securing 
the roads to Tebessa, Thala, and Sbiba. The subsequent battle at the Kasserine Pass is ultimately 
where Rommel’s advance was halted, due to a combination of internal command disputes 
between Rommel and von Arnim, restrictive orders from Berlin, American artillery fire, and lack 
of supplies, above all fuel. However, the battle was not without the effect of registering a 
massive shock to the mostly inexperienced U.S. forces. The effects of Rommel’s onslaught 
against U.S. forces in Tunisia, as historian Niall Barr puts it, “caused much soul searching.”149 
Part of this “soul searching” inevitably led to heads rolling. On March 5 Fredendall was relieved 
of his command of II Corps and by March 11 he was on his way back to the United States. It was 
a move that Eisenhower had to handle with care as Marshall knew Fredendall, and, in fact, it was 
Marshall who had initially suggested Fredendall for the command the previous year.150 
Fredendall, a man who harbored an open disdain for the British, had a strained relationship with 
Anderson at best. More importantly, before Rommel’s advance into the Faid Pass, Fredendall 
began creating an underground bunker for his command center in the walls of a ravine roughly 
sixty miles behind his front lines, while at the same time his forward lines were not adequately 
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prepared.151 It is of little wonder why Eisenhower sought to relieve him. Yet, he was not the only 
officer to be sacked in AFHQ.  
 As was previously stated, Mockler-Ferryman was officially replaced on March 25, 
however, Eisenhower had requested his replacement before Rommel’s counter-attack had even 
ended. Indeed, the evidence pointing towards Mockler-Ferryman’s removal based on 
performance is quite substantial. Disagreements between Rommel and von Arnim, and a genuine 
lack of men and material had dominated the perceptions of Allied intelligence circles leading to a 
belief that an Axis drive in the south was simply not possible. Rather the information that had 
been gathered seemed to point to an advance by von Arnim further north at Fondouk, the 
junction between French and British forces and an area of the Allied line deemed to be a weak 
point. Apparently Mockler-Ferryman believed that Rommel simply did not have the fuel nor the 
transportation needed to bring his forces into Tunisia.152 This assumption was not shared by 
Brigadier General Paul M. D. Robinett, commander of Combat Command B of the 1st Armored 
Division. Robinett’s group had been tasked to shore up the defenses at Fondouk; however, his 
reconnaissance had shown no signs of an Axis build-up in the area. Additionally, Anderson had 
placed his faith in the intelligence that had been gathered and the interpretations at both his 
headquarters and AFHQ, refusing to release Robinett to assist Combat Command A in the south 
when Rommel began his attack. According to historian Stephen E. Ambrose, the intelligence 
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failure was blamed on Mockler-Ferryman who had been “wedded to one type of information, 
had ignored too much evidence about the build-up [of Axis forces in the south] and had to 
go.”153 The “one type of information” referred to was Ultra, the top-secret decrypts of German 
communications that gave the Allies an enormous advantage over their opponent for the last few 
years of the war. Unfortunately for Mockler-Ferryman, Rommel was also notorious for 
disobeying orders.   
The over-reliance on one source of intelligence seems to be a common theme in the 
critique of the intelligence apparatus during the spring of 1943. Indeed, Major-General Sir 
Kenneth Strong, the officer who replaced Mockler-Ferryman, agrees with this assessment in his 
memoirs. “Intelligence staffs too often based their judgements on one isolated piece of 
information, in which they had come to believe implicitly, and tended to disregard any contrary 
or alternative possibilities in the cherished theory. This is unfortunately true.” He also contends 
that Eisenhower largely blamed the intelligence failure for the setback as well and, interestingly, 
that this position was also held by Roosevelt, “who [had] asked why the attack had not been 
foreseen.”154 In his own post-war account, Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower demonstrates this 
apparent focus of blame on Mockler-Ferryman by stating that the intelligence coming from U.S. 
troops in the south had been disregarded entirely. That “The belief that the main attack was… to 
come through Fondouk persisted, both at [First] Army headquarters and, as I later learned, in the 
G-2 Division at AFHQ. The G-2 error was serious. After the battle I replaced the head of my 
Intelligence organization…”155 His line of reasoning is similar to that given in a cable to 
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Marshall on February 21, the day before Rommel withdrew.156 Among other things, Eisenhower 
informed Marshall of the intelligence shortcoming, stating that “Due to faulty G-2 estimates in 
this and lower headquarters, the First Army did not become convinced, until too late, that the 
attack through Faid Pass was really the main effort.”157 Although the common narrative seems to 
place the blame on Mockler-Ferryman, there was an attempt to clear his name, however, it does 
not seem to have been deemed adequate by many, if any, historians.158 
One such historian is Ralph Bennett who takes the common narrative and expands on it, 
in a more or less hostile tone toward Mockler-Ferryman. Bennett’s aim seems to place the lion’s 
share, if not all, of the blame on the ACoS, G-2 starting with the invocation of a quote by 
Montgomery who called him a “‘a pure theorist without practical experience.’”159 He continues 
by expounding on the established notion of over reliance on one source of information, but 
deflects any sort of blame that might befall Ultra:  
As has been made clear already, [Mockler-Ferryman’s] mistake was not so much 
excessive reliance on Ultra as forgetting (or not possessing enough operational 
experience to realize) that although everything Ultra said was true, in the sense that 
there was no need to assess the reliability of each bit of information before using it, 
yet it had always to be borne in mind that higher authority might hold a different 
opinion from that of the author of a given decrypted message, that even the author 
himself might change his plans after issuing it (as Rommel had done), and—most 
important—that there were usually vital links in the chain of information that did not 
appear in Ultra at all.160 
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 Bennett also challenges the attempt to exonerate Mockler-Ferryman. In his sixth 
appendix, he chastises the attempt by Stephen Ambrose to do this in an article he published in 
the Journal of Contemporary History. The information Ambrose presents states that Mockler-
Ferryman was dismissed to even out the sacking of Fredendall in order to avoid any notion of 
national bias. Bennett points to the fact that Ambrose relied on information given to him based 
off of what the official British intelligence history was going to say, which was published the 
same year as Ambrose’s article. Bennett also asserts that the official history, British Intelligence 
in the Second World War, fails to exonerate Mockler-Ferryman in any substantial way. 
Returning to the claim made by Ambrose, Bennett points to the fact that in his book Eisenhower, 
published three years after the article, Ambrose performs an about-face and makes no mention of 
the information given to him on Mockler-Ferryman.161 The full text of Ambrose’s “attempt” is 
located in the endnotes of his article “Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War 
II” and reads as follows:  
I am delighted to report that since submitting this article, Michael Foot has set me 
straight on this matter. He writes:  
This is I am afraid a mistake. Just before Mockler-Ferryman died, I was sent down 
to see him with a message from Edward Thomas (Hinsley’s deputy), that Hinsley’s 
vol ii is going to clear Mockler-Ferryman entirely from the asperations that 
Eisenhower had to cast on him. Eisenhower sacked (hardly before time?) the 
American corps commander who had been surprised in the Kasserine Pass, felt that 
for reasons of Anglo-American amity he had to sack some senior British officer 
also, and sacked the Moke because he was one who could most easily at that 
moment be spared. Bletchley’s files indicate that Mockler-Ferryman fully 
understood what the Germans were going to do and had made no secret of it to his 
commander. Eisenhower’s message to Marshall was all part of the cover.162 
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The information given to Ambrose clearly indicates that the official British history would 
indeed clear Mockler-Ferryman’s name. However, this whole topic would not be an issue if the 
official history definitively cleared Mockler-Ferryman’s name, and so Bennett’s critique is not 
entirely unwarranted. Through a combination of both the regular text and the 18th appendix, the 
official history paints a rather interesting picture of the Allied intelligence apparatus during 
Torch and the subsequent push to Tunisia, leading up to Kasserine. It describes a rather 
convoluted system for relaying Ultra intelligence from Bletchley Park to North Africa and that, 
despite being largely fixed by early December, “the critical period had passed, and the Axis 
powers had succeeded in reinforcing their bridgehead in Tunisia and consolidating their position 
there.” This was exacerbated by poorly trained intelligence units that were sent to AFHQ and 
First Army in a piecemeal fashion, preventing any efficient means of decrypting intelligence in 
the field. It also states that the G-2 staff at AFHQ, that was to coordinate and direct the lower-
level intelligence units, was just as equally inexperienced, and that the G-2, of First Army was 
not fully operational until January 1943 and was not tasked with intercepting Enigma 
communications for the first seven weeks of the campaign, during which everything had to be 
sent back to Bletchley Park.163 However, the official history falls short of vindicating Mockler-
Ferryman in that it provides no outright claim that he was sacked in order to make things fair 
within AFHQ, nor does it even mention him by name.  
Interestingly, before his attack on Mockler-Ferryman, Bennett’s book seems to reinforce 
the narrative of the official history making his claims seem a bit confusing and contradictory. He 
states:  
                                                 
163 F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 
IV, Its Influence on Operations and Strategy, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 577-592, 739-746.  
72 
 
In marked contrast to the lavish intelligence Ultra provided in January, at just this 
time interception of the unprecedented variety of keys (the consequence of the 
multiplication of [Axis] operational commands) was incomplete, and decryption 
exceptionally difficult because of the new German security procedures. The result 
was scrappy and confusing intelligence which made interpretation unusually 
hazardous, particularly for the relatively inexperienced staffs in Algiers, so that in the 
end not only was no proper warning given of Rommel’s and von Arnim’s intentions, 
but disconnected items were fitted together in such a way as to prolong the plausible 
but erroneous belief that the main attack would be made at Fondouk rather than Faid 
or from the direction of Gafsa. 
 Yet, despite seemingly admitting that it was in fact a multitude of factors that led to the 
intelligence failure, Bennett quickly re-establishes the narrative of human failure, setting up his 
attack on Mockler-Ferryman. “It was Ultra’s most notorious and regrettable failure, an object 
lesson in the drawing of overconfident conclusions from evidence too weak to support them, and 
a warning against relying too exclusively on a single source of intelligence. As with the British 
in 1941, human errors in judgment, rather than adequate intelligence material, were the reason 
for discomfiture on the field of battle.”164 
What is left out from Bennett’s analysis are two letters from Eisenhower to Brooke, the 
British CIGS, from the edited volume of Eisenhower’s correspondence, The Papers of Dwight 
David Eisenhower;165 something that Mockler-Ferryman was keen to place in his memoirs. On 
February 20 Eisenhower cabled Brooke directly requesting a replacement for Mockler-Ferryman. 
“I feel it essential to strengthen the Intelligence Section of this headquarters at the head of which 
I desire to retain a British officer.” The officer in question, Eisenhower continues, should have “a 
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broader insight into German mentality and method.” Placing the decision in the hands of Brooke 
he states, “If you concur I request that you make the change without prejudice to Mockler-
Ferryman who has done some fine work which I fully appreciate.”166 Almost a month later 
Eisenhower cabled Brooke again praising Mockler-Ferryman extensively. On March 14 
Eisenhower informed Brooke that Strong had begun taking over G-2, but spends a majority of 
the letter speaking highly of Mockler-Ferryman and the job that he was able to accomplish. He 
states that “At the time he [Mockler-Ferryman] was faced with the very difficult task of 
organizing a completely integrated G-2 section with the British and American officers—none of 
the latter being known to him. Moreover, he was called upon at the very beginning to operate in 
addition to organizing and planning the Intelligence set-up.” He continues by claiming that “I 
feel that Mockler-Ferryman has had a very difficult and exacting task involving great 
responsibility,” and that during the planning phases of Torch “I doubt if we could have found a 
more capable man.” Eisenhower then affirms that he looks to Strong in order to fix the 
deficiencies in interpreting intelligence that had caused the debacle earlier in the month at 
Kasserine. Yet, whereas Eisenhower could have left it at that he continues to talk highly of 
Mockler-Ferryman. Referring to his comments on fixing the intelligence apparatus he asserts that 
“I do not, however, by this comment wish to convey the impression that Mockler-Ferryman has 
in any way failed and trust that my analysis of his qualities, given above, will make my estimate 
of his value clear and indicate my appreciation of his fine work. I sincerely hope that he will be 
given a command assignment commensurate with his ability and conveying a recognition of his 
services to both nations during the TORCH operation.”167  
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The letter from Eisenhower to Marshall that is mentioned in Ambrose’s note exudes a 
notably different tone. Part of it has been mentioned above in discussing the intelligence 
estimates of AFHQ and First Army and the replacement of Mockler-Ferryman. Eisenhower 
continued, however, in explaining his rationale for replacing the ACoS G-2 stating that “in the 
broad aspect of the campaign, I realize that this affair is only an incident, but I am provoked that 
there was such reliance placed upon particular types of intelligence that the general instructions 
were considered inapplicable. In this connection and for your eyes only I have asked for the 
relief of my G-2. He is British and the head of that section must be a British officer because of 
the network of special signal establishments he operates…”168 Indeed, Eisenhower seems to 
eschew injecting any emotion towards the matter at all, unlike in his cables to Brooke; although 
it seems likely that he was simply trying to appease the CIGS and was speaking frankly with 
Marshall.  
Yet, there is another interesting factor about how Ambrose acquired his information that 
must be addressed—what he was told is corroborated by Mockler-Ferryman’s memoirs and 
papers. In the finished copy of his memoirs Mockler-Ferryman states that upon reporting to the 
Military Secretary, Sir Colville Wemyss, he was told that the entire ordeal was “an unfortunate 
business” and that nothing would officially appear in his “personal papers” at the War Office. 
“[F]rom which,” he continues, “I deduced, perhaps wrongly, that I had been made some sort of 
political scape-goat.” He then describes the event above simply stating that he was contacted, 
years afterward, by a “man who had been concerned with the incident.” The individual told him 
that “Washington had insisted on two scape-goats, one British, one American. The American 
was the U.S. Corps Commander.” He then points out that his removal from North Africa did not 
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preclude him being awarded the Companion of the Bath and the U.S. Legion of Merit, both 
highly prestigious awards.169 The “man” Mockler-Ferryman refers to can reasonably be assumed 
to be Michael Foot, the individual who gave the information to Ambrose. In the papers of 
Mockler-Ferryman housed at the archives at Kings College, London, exists the original copy of a 
letter addressed to a Captain S. W. C. Pack of the Royal Navy and dated April 21, 1974. Pack 
had put an ad in The Telegraph the previous day requesting information on Operation Torch and 
the letter was a reply to this request. In it Mockler-Ferryman attached a draft copy of his memoir 
containing the passage described above.170 Mockler-Ferryman died four years later in 1978.171 
The cables from Eisenhower to Brooke and Eisenhower to Marshall discussed above paint 
a picture that may be looked as if Eisenhower was simply appealing to the British in order to 
prevent hard feelings. Indeed, the same could be said for the awards given to Mockler-Ferryman 
after his dismissal. However, the command that Mockler-Ferryman was given after he was 
relieved of duty generates another possibility. He was sent to the Special Operations Executive 
(SOE), which “was an independent British secret service” established in July 1940 with the 
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purpose of “conducting subversive warfare.” His command entailed the control of resistance 
forces in Western Europe, which itself was an integrated Anglo-American sub-section of SOE.172 
The section of SOE that Mockler-Ferryman was given command of was created around the time 
that AFHQ was officially activated and was a merger of British and American secret service 
organizations. In September 1942 the British and American chiefs of staff agreed to combine the 
component of SOE in charge of northern Europe, known as the London Group, and the section of 
the American Office of Strategic Services responsible for northwest Europe into what became 
known as SOE/SO. The name subsequently changed in May 1944 to Special Force Headquarters, 
which SHAEF exercised operational control over. Mockler-Ferryman remained in command of 
this organization until 1945.173 When compared to the outcome of Fredendall, who was given a 
training command in the United States, Mockler-Ferryman’s fate seems to lend some credibility 
to the idea that he was not sacked purely for incompetence.174  
While the above discussions do not equal definitive evidence, they are illuminating. The 
establishment of a timeline concerning the information given to both Mockler-Ferryman and 
Ambrose indicates that it came from the same individual, Michael Foot,175 who was directly 
involved in the creation of the official British history on intelligence work during World War II. 
Additionally, the seeming contradiction of Bennett’s argument and the letters that he disregarded 
do not provide substantial evidence either; however, they make his claim suspect. Despite this, it 
is necessary to also compare the events surrounding the sacking of Fredendall and how they 
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relate to that of Mockler-Ferryman. As previously covered, Fredendall was sacked on March 5 
and sent home on the 11th. This is interesting considering that in Eisenhower’s March 14 letter to 
Brooke he indicated that Mockler-Ferryman was still in North Africa helping Strong get 
adjusted. Additionally, according to historian Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower had demonstrated 
reluctance in relieving Fredendall in the first place. He asserts that as early as January, when the 
CP at Constantine was established, that “The most serious of Eisenhower’s proliferating 
command problems in Tunisia remained Lloyd Fredendall.”176  
In mid-January Truscott, Eisenhower’s “second in command” at the CP in Constantine, 
warned Eisenhower of the state of Fredendall’s headquarters. Truscott had visited the new II 
Corps headquarters shortly after it had relocated outside of the town of Tebessa and found that 
Fredendall had ordered the construction of underground bunkers for his headquarters in an 
isolated valley “a good sixty or seventy miles” from the front.177 On January 30 Eisenhower 
cabled Marshall informing him that he planned on visiting the front in the next few days and that 
he was particularly interested in visiting Fredendall’s area. His reasoning for this specificity was 
that he was “quite sure that in that sector we must keep up a bold and aggressive front….” Thus, 
it would appear that Eisenhower took Truscott’s warning seriously but wanted to verify the 
situation for himself. However, on his trip to the front Eisenhower was able to visit Anderson’s 
headquarters and was unable to reach Fredendall’s position.178 Although he was unable to assess 
the state of Fredendall’s headquarters his doubts as to Fredendall’s ability to “get along” with the 
British and French seemed to be assuaged during his visit with Anderson. On February 3 
Eisenhower cabled Marshall stating that Anderson was satisfied with Fredendall and that he 
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himself no longer harbored any doubts about Fredendall. In fact, the following day Eisenhower 
even recommended to Marshall that Fredendall be promoted.179 The same day, however, 
Eisenhower also sent an unofficial message to Fredendall that seems to belie Eisenhower’s 
proclaimed satisfaction with the commander. 
In his February 4 cable to Fredendall, which was sent unofficially so that it would 
completely bypass Anderson, Eisenhower stated that he no longer had any more concerns as to 
Fredendall’s open disdain towards the British. This would appear to be in-line with what 
Eisenhower told Marshall, however, Eisenhower included a rather interesting and subtle message 
in closing the topic. After stating that he has no doubts as to Fredendall’s “loyalty and 
determination” he continues by impressing on Fredendall that “our Allies have got to be partners 
and not people that we view with suspicion and doubt.” This raises the question as to whether or 
not Eisenhower’s doubts about Fredendall had actually disappeared. Indeed, Eisenhower 
continues in the cable to address other issues raised by Truscott’s visit to the II Corps 
headquarters: 
One of the things that gives me the most concern is the habit of some of our generals 
in staying too close to their command posts…Ability to move rapidly is largely 
dependent upon an intimate knowledge of the ground and conditions along the front. 
As you well know, this can be gained only through personal reconnaissance and 
impressions. Generals are expendable just as any other item in the Army; and, 
moreover, the importance of having the general constantly present in his command 
post is frequently overemphasized.180  
This approach stands in stark contrast to Eisenhower’s remarks to Major General 
Thomas T. Handy, a long-time friend and the officer who replaced him at the OPD, in a 
January 28 cable. Although the main purpose of the cable was to smooth over any harsh-
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feelings with the OPD over the results of the Casablanca Conference, Eisenhower firmly 
declared his dedication to the principles of unity of command and effort. “I constantly 
watch for any flare-ups that might endanger the work so far done and I think that everyone 
knows, both British and American, I would ruthlessly eliminate any man who violates my 
instructions and my convictions on this point.”181 Indeed, General Frank Ross had been 
relieved of command only two days before on January 26; however, Ross’s dismissal may 
not have been by Eisenhower. After the Casablanca Conference ended on January 24, 
Marshall toured the American rear-areas of AFHQ in order assess the difficulties in which 
Eisenhower was facing. He was so appalled by its dysfunctional state that he promptly 
relieved several senior officers of duty as a message.182 Thus, it seems reasonable that Ross 
may have been relieved by Marshall and not by Eisenhower which, if true, would fall in 
line with comments made by historians on Eisenhower’s reluctance to relieve Fredendall.  
Ambrose notes that Eisenhower had no precedence in relieving officers and this, in 
conjunction with the fact that Marshall hand-picked Fredendall, led him to not relieve him right 
away.183 This latter point is also made by historian Joseph Patrick Hobbs who states that 
“Because Fredendall was a Marshall selection, Eisenhower moved carefully,” and is 
corroborated by D’Este who claims that during this period Eisenhower’s “debt to Marshall was 
so huge that he was unable or unwilling to carve out his own independence.”184 Ambrose also 
points out that “Later in the war, when more was at stake and he had more confidence in himself, 
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[Eisenhower] would relieve commanders at the first sign of uncertainty in battle, and Fredendall 
had already shown many signs of uncertainty.”185 
This latter point is significant. If Eisenhower was truly reluctant to relieve Fredendall 
because he was the personal pick of his mentor; that he had no precedence in relieving officers 
under him (especially senior officers in charge of combat units); and that given his history with 
Marshall, Eisenhower felt compelled not to cross him, there seems to be good reason to suggest 
that his motivations for relieving Mockler-Ferryman were not solely based on failures in 
interpreting intelligence. In this light it is possible that Eisenhower capitalized on the situation in 
order to establish a precedent in reliving senior officers; that in order to gain “credibility” in the 
eyes of Marshall, which he may have deemed necessary before sacking Fredendall, he had to 
relieve another senior officer as well. It is possible then, considering everything presented thus 
far, that Mockler-Ferryman was indeed a sacrificial lamb. The notion that Washington was 
pulling the strings raises yet another possibility. Roosevelt had already demonstrated his 
willingness to make final calls on military matters, both operationally and tactically. This shows 
that, at the least, he was not afraid to dip below the level of strategic concerns. Admittedly, this 
does not definitively show that he was also comfortable in recommending that officers be 
relieved in a lower headquarters. However, Strong’s comment on Roosevelt inquiring into why 
the debacle at Kasserine happened in the first place brings the specter of domestic political 
reality (so often ignored in military history) back into the limelight.  
Indeed, Roosevelt’s decision to invade North Africa was motivated by domestic politics, 
originally hoping to have U.S. forces fighting Germans before the mid-term elections, but also a 
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desire to keep North Africa out of Axis hands.186 More importantly, the Darlan deal had created 
a heated public outcry in the United States with both Eisenhower and the president becoming 
targets of the outrage. D’Este points out that one of the options available to Roosevelt would 
have been to sack Eisenhower, “an act for which there was ample precedent in American 
history.” Instead, Roosevelt opted to defend the decisions of his commander.187 Having already 
defended Eisenhower during a politically distasteful event, it seems entirely reasonable that 
Roosevelt would demand answers from the C-in-C as to why the U.S. suffered such a 
humiliating defeat. Fortunately, the public was not made fully aware of the details of the battle, 
especially the number of casualties inflicted on U.S. forces, providing some political buffer.188 
Thus, with the details of the tactical and intelligence failures kept close at hand, the demand for 
equal punishment could have been motivated by a desire to reinforce, in the public perception, 
the unity of the Anglo-American alliance. It could have also served as a way to dampen the 
internal tensions that arose surrounding poor performance of U.S. forces and reinforce the 
principle of unity within the alliance. By relieving both a British and American senior officer it 
would not appear as if only the U.S. forces were to blame, but that the British and Americans had 
fought, and failed, together. Indeed, even if the reality of the intelligence issues leading up to 
Rommel’s counter-attack were fully known to both governments, translating that to a national 
audience would simply have been impossible.  
In light of all this, some questions still remain regarding the fates of Mockler-Ferryman and 
Fredendall. In regard to Mockler-Ferryman, one must ask why a command encased in secrecy 
was given to someone who has supposedly shown themselves to be incompetent in their ability 
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to perform? The same could be said for Fredendall as well. Why was he promoted and allowed to 
preside over the training of U.S. troops if he was held largely responsible for the failures at the 
Battle of Kasserine Pass? Additionally, was his promotion also a means of assuaging any hard 
feelings for his failures, similar to the awards given to Mockler-Ferryman?  
The final conclusion on this matter is that more research and evidence is required in order 
to truly address the issues surrounding Mockler-Ferryman. At a minimum, the evidence provided 
thus far has hopefully demonstrated that the situation is much more complex than simply one 
man being at fault for the failings of an entire agency within a large command structure. This 
would seemingly have little effect on AFHQ as an organization, as it was still able to function 
effectively after the incident. On the other hand, it raises questions as to how far the British and 
Americans were willing to go in order to ensure that the perception of Allied unity was 
maintained. Here the implications for the officers at AFHQ, and all integrated Anglo-American 
commands for that matter, could have been substantial. By removing one senior officer from 
each nationality for the failures of many, it would establish the precedent that there will always 
be parity in dismissals; that above everything else, the perception of a united and unshakeable 
Anglo-American alliance was to be maintained. On a much smaller, but still potent, scale, the 
dismissal of one senior officer from each nationality would serve as a message to the entire 
headquarters. Simply put, the principle of “unity of command and effort” was the life-blood of 
AFHQ and of the Allied war effort. Without it the Allies would lose and so when serious failures 
were encountered both nations would bear responsibility. Many historians point to the fact that 
Eisenhower relieved numerous American officers for refusing to work with the British, but 
hardly anything seems to be mentioned about him relieving British officers. Claims of 
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appeasement aside, could the firing of both Fredendall and Mockler-Ferryman have also served 
as a way to demonstrate that no one was safe in violating Eisenhower’s coveted principles? 
 Whatever the final conclusion on the matter may be, the war continued after Mockler-
Ferryman was let go. Indeed, the fighting in Tunisia continued to rage until May 13, the day von 
Arnim surrendered and five days after the last Axis strongholds were breached by Allied forces. 
On May 7 a revitalized U.S. II Corps, led by Major General Omar Bradley, entered Bizerte 
accompanied by a successful assault on Tunis by First Army occurring on the same day.189 In the 
background of the fighting that led to the expulsion of the Axis powers from North Africa, 
AFHQ continued to grow. In fact, its enlargement served as a focal point of criticism from both 
the British and the Americans.190 
 Indeed, Eisenhower had been concerned with the growth of his headquarters as early as 
December, and tasked Truscott to conduct a study on how best to keep it at manageable size. 
Truscott, who had been waiting for orders to what would become the CP at Constantine, duly 
went about figuring out how to give Eisenhower recommendations.191 On December 30 Truscott 
submitted his harsh appraisal and his personal recommendations for trimming the size of AFHQ. 
According to the report, Truscott seemed to be quite concerned with a large amount of work 
being duplicated among the various staffs. He also recommended removing anyone from the 
headquarters whose primary role was not a staff function. However, in his final paragraph he 
acknowledged the fact that he had little understanding of organizational structures and was 
unable to conduct an extensive analysis of the various staffs. Yet, his closing remarks are telling 
of a general sentiment that existed at the time: “Mine is the point of view of the field commander 
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who comes to this Headquarters, is at once appalled by its size, and wonders how it can ever 
function efficiently…several officers have expressed similar sentiments.”192 Reflecting his 
findings in 1942, Truscott contends in his post-war accounts, Command Missions, that “The 
Allied nature of the headquarters was one of the principal reasons for [its] ponderous size…”193 
Indeed, the issue of size continued to bother Eisenhower into 1943 (see Appendix M). In a cable 
to Marshall on February 8 Eisenhower bluntly stated, “I am sure my staff thinks I am getting 
tougher and more arbitrary day by day but, although I admit the impossibility of working without 
adequate staffs, they do seem to develop diseases that include obesity and elephantiasis. 
Apparently only a sharp knife, freely wielded, provides any cure.”194 
 Throughout 1943 AFHQ made substantial increases “in range and complexity of 
functions” that led to what the official history mildly calls “an appreciable increase in 
personnel.” From November of 1942 to the end of 1943 AFHQ, despite Eisenhower’s desires to 
“trim the fat,” had grown to over twice its size—from 1,646 authorized personnel to 4,072. Even 
the number of personnel in November 1942 had not been anticipated. The September requests 
for U.S. personnel gave the optimistic estimate of only needing a combined total of 998 officers 
and enlisted soldiers. Before AFHQ had been moved completely to Algiers the U.S. compliment 
already numbered 1,308 officers and soldiers. Despite attempts made by both nations to reduce 
the ever-increasing size of their personnel commitment to AFHQ, it continued to balloon during 
the year. The British appeared to have fared better in this, with a relatively small increase of only 
486 total personnel. The U.S. contingent increased significantly in comparison. The advent of 
NATOUSA and SOS, NATOUSA, instigated a dramatic increase of 1,078 personnel by October. 
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Yet, and most surprisingly, by the end of 1943 the ratio of authorized British-to-U.S. personnel 
in AFHQ was nearly 1-to-1. Out of the 4,072 staff-related members of AFHQ, 2,012 were 
American and 2,060 were British (see Appendix N). Indeed, it would seem that although the 
principle of “unity of command and effort” created turmoil, the principle of “balanced 
personnel” was willingly adhered to.195 
 
Conclusion 
The trials and tribulations of unified and integrated command did not end in the summer of 
1943. The evolution of AFHQ, and the Anglo-American relationship that centered on it, 
continued to evolve during the invasions of Sicily (mid-July) and Southern Italy (early-
September), and with the merger of the British Middle East command, GHQ MEF, in 
December.196 As the war progressed the number of nationalities that were incorporated into 
AFHQ also expanded and between December 1943 and June 1944 AFHQ had grown to 
incorporate “contingents of Poles, Greeks, Brazilians, Jugoslavs [sic], and Belgians.”197 In 
January 1944, as the time drew near for a cross-channel invasion, Eisenhower was replaced as C-
in-C, AFHQ by Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. Later that month Eisenhower 
established SHAEF in the United Kingdom.198  
The lessons that Eisenhower learned in operating an integrated multi-national command 
structure during the campaigns of North Africa and Italy provided the foundation of his 
command at SHAEF. However, issues continued to linger within the Anglo-American alliance 
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concerning continued operations in the Mediterranean and command of ground and air forces. 
Eisenhower also bore the weight of pressure from the highest political and military echelons of 
both the United Kingdom and the United States.199 As a result, one of, if not the most, crucial 
concept that Eisenhower carried over from AFHQ to SHAEF was the principle of “unity of 
command and effort.”200 His stalwart defense of this principle proved invaluable in navigating 
these disputes.201 However, Eisenhower was only one man and in order to ensure that the 
principle of unity of command was adhered to within SHAEF he brought over numerous officers 
that had served with him at AFHQ; relying heavily on the trust established with his American 
and British subordinates in the grueling campaigns of 1942 and 1943. This trust was derived 
from the established premise that Eisenhower’s loyalty lay with the principle of unity of 
command and effort towards a unified victory.202  
Thus, the tumultuous period from AFHQ’s inception in August 1942 to the end of the 
North African campaign can be seen as only one part in the larger narrative of integrated 
command during World War II. Yet, it was a critical period in which the concepts of integrated 
command and unity of effort were tested in a command organization cobbled together in an 
astonishingly short period of time under conditions of extreme duress and uncertainty. As 
historian David Jablonsky notes:  
                                                 
199 Jablonsky, War by Land, Sea, and Air, 106. 
200 Pogue, Supreme Command, 41-42.  
201 Jablonsky, 113-117; Pogue, Supreme Command, 43-45. Of those, the issue of authority and implementation of 
the Allied air forces slated to be utilized in the cross-channel invasion seems to have been a salient issue that had 
persisted since Operation Torch.  
202 Jablonsky, War by Land, Sea, and Air, 106-107. The officers that were carried over from AFHQ included the 
Deputy Supreme Commander, CoS, CAO, the ACoS of G-2, the DACoS of G-3 as well as the “deputy chief of civil 
affairs, chief of press relations, chief of the psychological warfare division, and adjutant general.” The British CSC 
also drew heavily from their ranks in the Mediterranean that had experience in working with Eisenhower. These 
include “the chiefs of staff of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force and the Allied Naval Expeditionary 
Force…commander of British land forces and his chief air commander; and the British army commander for the 
invasion.” See Pogue, Supreme Command, 56-58. 
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In actuality, AFHQ was an ad hoc affair that established as a consequence an 
important, flexible organizational trend for the future. Throughout the rest of the war, 
the structure and personnel of the Allied organization would remain fluid depending 
on the demands of overall coalition strategy. But the essential foundation remained 
the principles of unity of command and unity of effort.203  
Simply put, the impact of AFHQ during World War II cannot be understated.204 
 The intent of this thesis has been two-fold. On the one hand it attempts to rectify what 
seems to be a rather astonishing dearth of literature on the genesis of a truly integrated multi-
national command organization. It struck me as odd that a period of history so extensively 
analyzed such as World War II would have so little on a concept that played such a monumental 
role in the war. This is not to say that no attempts have been made to address this issue, as my 
own research would not have been possible without the previous work of others. Herein lies the 
second aspect of my paper. I have attempted to build upon the foundations laid out by others in 
order to give more depth to not only the organization that embodied the concept of integrated and 
unified command, but also cast a light on the lesser-known officers who put it into practice. The 
latter aspect is a difficult task for any researcher as they are beholden to the information 
available. By focusing on a specific cadre of officers in AFHQ who demonstrated the principles 
on which the command was founded, the load of this task was significantly lightened. It also 
brought to light a more nuanced perspective on how these principles may have interacted with 
and were subject to the political realities of the war.  
                                                 
203 Jablonsky, War by Land, Sea, and Air, 70. 
204 The principle of “unity of command and effort” was not the only experience that benefited Eisenhower while in 
command of SHAEF. According to the official history other critical factors were dealing with the difficult political 
question that the French posed; the establishment and functioning of civil affairs and military governments; and the 
handling of public relations and psychological warfare, all of which resurfaced in the European Theater of 
Operations. While it is impossible to say that any of these were of little value, the principle of unity of command 
was the foundational glue that held both AFHQ and SHAEF together. One need only look at the Axis powers or the 
Triple Entente during World War I to see how a disjointed command may have played out.  
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Admittedly, my own work has been restricted in this endeavor as it covers less than a 
year of AFHQ operations, with still yet another year and a half left in the war and the creation of 
another integrated command structure that oversaw the cross-channel invasion and advance 
across France and the Low Countries, and into Nazi Germany. Even then, more could be done in 
a cross-comparison of coalition warfare between the Allied and Axis powers. Such an analysis 
would be obligated to consider the political events and motivations that acted in tandem, or 
conflicted, with the prosecution of the war by the militaries involved.205 As a result, a more 
comprehensive picture of not just World War II, but war more generally, could be realized; that 
political considerations, within the command, in the theater in which the command is operating, 
and on the home-front all play integral parts in how the command functions. Thus, it would 
appear that the Allied invasion of North Africa, and the Mediterranean theater more broadly, 
holds more historical riches and lessons learned than historians have been willing to accredit it.
                                                 
205   For one such work, see Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray, eds., Grand Strategy and Military Alliances 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
 
 
Note on Appendices 
 The following appendices serve as a visual guide to the text so that the reader can better 
understand the structural complexity of AFHQ. In regard to the personnel charts I have included 
the original footnotes as they appeared in the official history as they explain where these number 
come from. It is important to read these in order to understand the limitations of the charts. The 
historians who worked on these histories encountered difficulties in obtaining accurate numbers 
for all significant periods as “Such information was considered so voluminous and varied that 
many of the records were destroyed by the sections after their… usefulness [had] passed.” To 
avoid misuse of incomplete data only the numbers of “authorized personnel,” with the only 
exception being the chart for 1942 (the only complete roster found).206 Additionally, the dates for 
many of the charts in general, especially for the period of 1943, do not exactly match the periods 
in which they are referred to in the text. However, given the practice of destroying documents 
once they were no longer of use these charts may very well be the closest we can get to any 
specific period of AFHQ’s existence. Regardless, these charts capture the essence of AFHQ’s 
organizational structure and complexity of functions, making them invaluable to understanding 
the headquarters. Thus, I urge the reader to take these limitations into consideration when 
combining the information from the charts and text in order to furnish a more complete 
understanding of AFHQ. 
 
Citations for Appendices: 
The charts have all been drawn from the digital copies of the official history; however, I 
have chosen to cite the page number of the physical copy and not the PDF. This was done as it 
                                                 
206 History of AFHQ, Pt. 1, pg. vii, RG 498, NARA 2. 
 
 
allows future researchers to reference these pages regardless if they consult digital or physical 
copies of the histories. The digital copies can be downloaded from the Defense Technical 
Information Center website.207  For ease of reading the format I have chosen for the citations is 
as follows: “[the appendix referenced] – [the page number(s) where the chart can be found in the 
corresponding part/section].” 
Part 1 
Appendix A – 21  
Appendix B – 24  
Appendix C – 26  
Appendix D – 43  
Appendix E – 46  
Appendix F – 50  
Appendix G – 53  
Appendix H – 57  
 
Part 2, Section 1  
Appendix I – 117  
Appendix J – 113-116208  
Appendix K – 188-189  
Appendix L – 203  
 
Part 2, Section 2 
Appendix M – 241   
Appendix N – 246  
                                                 
207 United States Department of Defense, Defense Technical Information Center, 
https://publicaccess.dtic.mil/psm/api/service/search/search?q=&num=10&site=default_collection&as_epq=History+
of+Allied+Force+Headquarters&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_occt=any&btnG=Search. 
208 This is a word document created by me but copied directly from the official history text. 
 
 
Appendix O – 260  
Appendix P – 262   
Appendix Q – 299  
Appendix R – 303  
Appendix S – 323   
Appendix T – 327  
 
Part 2, Section 3  
Appendix U – 363  
Appendix V – 369  
Appendix W – 374  
Appendix X – 431  
Appendix Y – 434  
 
Part 3, Section 1  
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Total EM 345 723 257 97 1068 354
Combined Totals 
of Personnel 579 1067 581 202 1646 783
* Statistics taken from a Table of American Personnel in AFHQ, 19 
Nov 42, in G-l NATODSA file: T/0 AFHQ Did, contained in envelope at 
end of file.
# Statistics taken from British War Establishment, "R" Hq 
(VIII/374/1), 12 Oct 42.
x Statistics for British officersitaken from two different rosters: 
that of 19 Oct 42 or 1 Nov 42, whichever was more complete, since some 
sections had more complete rosters as of 19 Oct than in their lists of 
1 Nov. Roster of AFHQ Officers, c. 19 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8). 
Statistics for British warrant officers and other ranks who were ac- x 
tually on duty at AFHQ were obtained from statements by individuals who 
were with the various sections in Nov 42.
NOTE: The reason for the large discrepancy between the British 
authorized and actual personnel is found I in the fact that some of the 
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List of functions delegated by AFHQ to 18th Army Group (as listed in the official history): 
a. To develop tactical plans and issue directives for operations in the Tunisian area.
b. To command all the Allied ground forces in the Tunisian area.
c. To co-ordinate Army operations with Air and Navy through close liaison.
d. To regroup the Allied forces then fighting in the Tunisian area.
e. To from and train a general reserve.
f. To co-ordinate all intelligence activities of 1st and 8th Armies to the following extent:
(1) Intelligence was not to be collated at 18th Army Group.
(2) The Group Headquarters disseminated AFHQ intelligence to Armies and vice versa.
(3) It sent a daily intelligence situation report to AFHQ if necessary.
(4) Intelligence summaries and interrogation intelligence were to be sent directly to
AFHQ with copies to 18th Army Group.
(5) Signal intelligence of both 1st and 8th Armies was to be controlled and co-ordinated by
18th Army Group
g. It prepared British training and performed the normal staff functions for training British troops
in the Tunisian area.
h. Administrative functions:
(1) To co-ordinate and supervise the operational instructions on administrative policy.
(2) Routine administrative matters were to be dealt with directly between AFHQ and 1st
Army or II Corps; and between GHQ Middle East Forces and 8th Army.
i. Supply functions:
(1) supplies for 1st Army were to be administered by AFHQ; those of 8th Army by GHQ
MEF.
(2) 18th Army Group was to keep itself informed on the logistical situation to and in the
Tunisian area.
(3) It controlled the level of supply made available to each army.
(4) It established operational priorities for supplies to its subordinate units.
(5) Maintenance of air forces was to be the responsibility of AFHQ and GHQ MEF (for
strategic) and armies (for immediate air support units).
Appendix J
(6) The Ground Air Support Commander of 18th Army Group was to advise the
commander of 18th Army Group on air maintenance problems.
(7) Eighteenth Army Group Headquarters was not to issue executive orders for






« * S ° g
CO <S> O •O^^ -Ho -He-. c< -P1 s s g@ g.
< 3d 68 "SS
3 i S "g'go1 
2 ' fe ? ^ -d 1^fc-< <O G (DM d<: -a <y <B . +33 •§ >
a • c aa 5 — — «o < s 
icn |^tp £^^1OP-* a c ija B
W Oj 0 vH ^S COCO
Dt, H 0 "0 >0 .S3< ^ -o i ^o £-1 31 gs&























































































































































































-c-s^g• *< ,a g C 8 .5*«:*i:*i:j*s 8»:•.*«>.sf, g'•sl^fs^? §5!ri agsstl^sji












TABLE OF AFHQ, AND NATOUS.A AUTHORIZED 'PERSONNEL¢ 
November 1942 and November 1943 
OFFICERS ENLISTED MEN 
Am Br Am Br 
Nov Nov Oc') Dec Nov Nov oc; Deo 
Rank 42* 4� 42 - 4� Rank 42* 43X 42 43® 
Gen & M/Sgt- 29 66 
Col 52 114 3'7 63 - T/Sgt 31 119 
Lt Col 41 124 48 101 S/Sgt 25 120 23 44 
Maj 48 151 98 16'7 Teo 13 43 12'7 
Capt 53 163 85 174 Sgt 1'7 83 89 130 
1st Lt 21 129 22 50 Tee 14 62 262 
2d Lt 2 9 Cpl 2 55 88 176 
Tee 15 50- 225
Totals: 21 '7 690 290 555 Pfo 86 129 71 145 
Pvt '78 452 940 
WARRANT OFFICERS 
cwo 4 30 23 25 
WOJ'G 13 25 31 48 
Totals: 17 55 54 '73 345 1264 723 1435 
� 1943 
Total Americans: 579 2012 
Total British . lQ§.1 2060 . 
COMBINED TOTALS: 1646 4072 
<t The statistics on Ameriea:n authorized personnel 
do not include · those for the Head,quarters SOS N.ATOUSA 
or its subordinate base sections. 
*· American authorized personnel as shown on .AFH�
table of personnel of 19 Nov 43 in envelope at back of 
G-1 N.ATOUS.A file: T/0 .AFHQ, Old.
x From tabulation of .American authorized .AFHQ, and 
.N.A'l'OUSA T/O's in effect during .Nov 43 (from .AG AFHQ. and 
G-1 MTUUS.A files).
# British authorized War Bstablishnient for "R"
Headquarters and Increment for Hq First .Army (B), VIII/ 
374/1, 12 Oct 42. 
@ AFHQ War Establishment(�), XII/1/4, effective 
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